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DIVORCE AND THE THIRD PARTY: SPOUSAL
SUPPORT, PRIVATE AGREEMENTS, AND
THE STATE
SALLY BURNETT .SHARPt
The tension between the rights of individuals to control the distributional
consequences of divorce by private contract and the interests of the state inpre-
serving its role as third party to marriage and divorce has produced an often
bewildering complexity in the law surrounding the operation and effect of separa-
tion agreements. In this Article Professor Sharp examines the efforts of North
Carolina to accommodate these conflicting interests. A greatly diminished em-
phasis upon fault and a partial blurring of the distinction between incorporated
and unincorporated agreements have expanded both the scope and effcacy of
private contracts in this area. Contradictory state policies on reconciliation and
the continued reluctance of courts to develop standards for fraud, unfairness or
undue influence tend toward an opposite effect. Professor Sharp also discusses
the relationship between property settlements and separation agreements and the




It is commonplace to speak of the state as the third party to marriage and,
by implication, to divorce as well.1 In fact, however, the state is a relatively
unobtrusive, almost silent, partner in an ongoing marriage. It denominates
marriage a status and prescribes the incidents of that status, but otherwise
leaves the other partners largely to their own devices. It is only upon the
breakdown of marriage that the intrusive nature of this additional partner and
the marital incidents it will then impose may be fully realized.
The state need not always be such an obstrusive third party. Owing
largely to the rapid growth of no-fault divorce, there exists in all states today a
kind of "de facto unilateral divorce. ' 2 It is possible, therefore, for dissolution
t Assistant Professor of Law, University of North Carolina.
1. The supreme court of North Carolina has succinctly stated the proposition: "There are
three parties to a marriage contract--the husband, the wife, and the State. For this reason mar-
riage is denominated a status, and certain incidents are attached thereto by law which may not be
abrogated without the consent of the third party, the State." Ritchie v. White, 255 N.C. 450, 453,
35 S.E.2d 414, 415 (1945). In a much quoted opinion, the Supreme Court of the United States
explained: "Marriage, as creating the most important relation in life, as having more to do with
the morals and civilization of a people than any other institution, has always been subject to the
control of the legislature." Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888).
2. Glendon, Marriage and the State: The Wthering 4way of Marriage, 62 VA. L. REv. 663,
704. Freed & Foster, Divorce in the Fofty States.- An Outline, 11 FAM. L.Q. 297, 306 (1977), gives
the following breakdown on grounds for divorce in this country: fifteen states have irretrievable
breakdown as the sole grounds for divorce; in sixteen more, irretrievable breakdown is an alterna-
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of marriage to be only slightly more difficult than entry into marriage was in
the first instance, particularly if a couple have no children, no substantial
property, and no alimony claims. If, however, there are substantial economic
consequences, in the form of spousal or child support or division of property,
then the apparent ease with which a decree of divorce may be obtained be-
comes almost wholly illusory. It is in these circumstances that divorce, at least
as far as its distributive consequences are concerned, is often but an anticli-
mactic end to what has been a traumatic, time-consuming, risky, and expen-
sive process.
Moreover, for reasons that are discussed later in this Article, the divorce
process is largely adversarial in nature and is steeped in a legacy of fault.3 It is
controlled in whole or in part by the state, which at a minimum acts as the
final arbiter of the economic consequences of divorce. In litigation, where the
state exercises maximum control, the pressures of an adversarial system of dis-
pute settlement combine with a judicial fault-based model for determining ec-
onomic outcomes to reach a result that geometrically compounds the
deficiencies of both systems.4 Parties involved in no-holds-barred domestic
litigation are much more apt to be embittered than satisfied, both with the
system and with their partners. This reaction may be due in part to unrealistic
expectations of what a court can do. It may also be an eminently reasonable
response to what a court has done.
5
Not surprisingly, lawyers and their clients have sought alternatives to
court imposed settlements. The most readily available, frequently used, and
rive to more traditional fault grounds; incompatibility is a ground in seven states; and living sepa-
rate and apart for the required statutory length of time is a ground for divorce in twenty states.
3. See text accompanying notes 13-30 infra. The no-fault "revolution" has not yet signaled
the demise of fault in the divorce process. Rather in many cases, and particularly in North Caro-
lina, the fault inquiry has simply been refocused: who is entitled to obtain a divorce may no
longer be determined by fault; but who gets what from a divorce, including alimony, custody,
attorneys' fees, and even property division, often is. Commentators have not been slow to point
this out. See, e.g., 2 A. LINDEY, SEPARATION AGREEMENTS AND ANTI-NUPTIAL CONTRACTS § 3 1,
at 31-37 (rev. ed. 1978). Annot., 80 A.L.R.3rd 1116, 1119 (1977). For a somewhat different per-
spective, dealing with the experience of California, the first state to adopt no-fault grounds, see
Weitzman & Dixon, The Alimony Myth: Does No-Fault Divorce Make a Dffierence?, 14 FAM. L.Q.
141 (1980).
4. The fundamental premise of this article is that both systems are largely inappropriate and
counterproductive in a domestic law context. In operation, if not by definition, the goal of the
adversary process is to pursue the interests of one's client in a rather single-minded fashion, with-
out regard to fairness. But any agreement that fails to achieve a basically fair result becomes
unworkable in the long run. It will usually lead to litigation in the future and thereby become
self-defeating. In essence, the adversarial approach creates new wounds instead of starting the
healing process with the old ones. At its best, as some commentators have noted, it is "a limited
view of the lawyer's function in matrimonial matters [which] will not benefit even his own client."
Pilpel & Zavin, Separation Agreements: Their Function and Future, 18 LAW & CONTEMP. PROD.
33, 36 (1953). See also notes 5 & 30 infra.
5. Parties involved in fault-based litigation often look to the process to provide them with a
kind of vindication-an economic reward to symbolize their freedom from blame. Instead the
process usually just adds new and volatile fuel to old fires, particularly when combined with the
adversarial system. As one commentator concluded, "[Agreement seems to be universal. . . that
the negative repercussions of divorce are directly related to the existence of the adversary process.
The longer. . .[one] is immersed in the guilt-innocence controversy. . . the greater the potential
for long-lasting scars to develop." Johnson, A Special Code of Professional Responsibility in Do-
mestic Relations Statutes?, 9 FAM. L.Q. 595, 596 (1975).
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potentially most salutary, alternative to a judicially imposed resolution is the
separation agreement, or combined separation agreement and property settle-
ment. It should be understood, however, that separation agreements are infre-
quently, if ever, detours by which one avoids altogether the disadvantages of
the adversarial-fault system. Indeed, it is the very existence of that system
which not only prompts parties to seek a private settlement but conditions and
guides the entire negotiating process. 6 As commentators have pointed out,
parties always bargain "in the shadow of the law"--in the light of results that
the law might impose were agreement not to be reached.
7
Additionally, the state controls this process of private bargaining in other,
more direct ways. It determines the conditions under which the contracts may
be executed, rescinded, or enforced. It forbids some types of agreements alto-
gether and draws an often crucial distinction between those it has imposed
directly and those it merely has approved.8 All of this is done in the name of
public policy, a policy usually articulated as one that aims at preservation of
the integrity of marriage and its essential elements. 9 It is also good policy to
promote private settlements of disputes. An obvious conflict between these
policies arises as furtherance of one necessarily threatens encroachment upon
the other. It is largely the tension between these competing policies, both of
considerable validity, that has led to the development of legal standards that
are confusing, conflicting, and often "striking for their lack of precision". 10 At
the least these standards are dysfunctional in that they provide "a bargaining
backdrop clouded by uncertainty.""I They also create true pitfalls for the un-
wary lawyer who underestimates the complexity of this area.
This Article will focus on the continuing struggle of one state to develop
standards that will accommodate both the interests of the state in marriage
dissolution and the interest of the parties in greater freedom to contract pri-
vately. 12 The following discussion will indicate that the results thus far are
6. In most states, no-fault divorce legislation, provisions for property division, and the abo-
lition of such traditional defenses as recrimination, condonation, collusion, and connivance have
tended greatly to increase the pressures towards private negotiation. See Mnookin & Kornhauser,
Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.L 950; Glendon, Supra note
2, at 716. This may not be true in North Carolina, however. Since the abolition of the recrimina-
tory defenses in 1978, North Carolina has in effect made unilateral divorce on separation grounds
available to any spouse. At the time this article is being written, however, there is no provision in
the statutes for equitable division of property. Thus, a supporting spouse seeking a divorce has
considerably greater bargaining power. This may force a dependent spouse to negotiate from a
position of weakness, but it is just as likely to force both parties into alimony litigation.
7. Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 6, at 968.
8. See text accompanying notes 242-52 infra.
9. The interests of a state in its own role and in the policies it seeks to further are quite
similar. They are not, however, identical. This article will seek to show that some public policies
could in fact be furthered by a dimunition in the role of the state in the dissolution process,
whereas others might be better promoted by more participation from the state.
10. Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 6, at 969.
11. Id.
12. The problems faced in making this accomodation are certainly national in scope. Such a
focus would be largely impossible because of the great variation in the laws among, and occasion-
ally even within, states in this subject area. The discussion here, therefore, will center largely on
the law of North Carolina, although an attempt has been made to identify and distinguish general
principles and policies.
1981]
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mixed. Conflicting policies, even when confronted thoughtfully, have at times
produced conflicting results. In other instances, blind adherence to outmoded
policies has produced anomalous results. Nonetheless, to some degree a work-
able compromise has been developed. But the extent to which the parties may
determine for themselves the economic consequences of divorce depends en-
tirely on how carefully the intricate rules of the state are understood and fol-
lowed. At a time when the balance of private contract rights and state policy
interests is precariously subject to change, the rules are complex indeed.
B. The Legacy of Fault
Central to an understanding of the policies that underlie a state's inter-
vention into the terms and conditions of marriage dissolution is a recognition
of the almost religious significance accorded the institution of marriage.
13
Most of our divorce laws derive from a time in which marriage was identified
wholly with the idea of family, and in which family was identified as the nurs-
ery of morality and the foundation of social and political values and institu-
tions. That an institution of such critical importance to the state might be
dissolved without fault was unthinkable. In a very real sense, divorce was a
kind of offense against the state, and an offense implied an offender. The
North Carolina Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed, in terms stronger than
those that most courts might find appropriate, the importance of fault:
Nor do we find the notion of fault repugnant to sound public policy
... . Sound public policy would dictate that the party who violated
that binding [marriage] contract should continue to bear its financial
burden when he or she can reasonably do so and where that is neces-
sary to prevent a relatively greater economic hardship on the party
without fault.'
4
The continuing legacy of fault, shared to varying degrees by most states,
clearly has a critical impact on litigated and private divorce settlements. It is
rooted analytically in the concept of reciprocal duties in a marriage: that a
husband has a duty to support his wife and that she in turn has a duty to
render services to him in the home.' 5 Although the husband's duty of, and the
wife's concomitant right to, support are increasingly vulnerable to attack on
equal protection grounds,' 6 this duty and right formed and largely continue to
13. Again, although innumerable other instances could be cited, the case of Maynard v. Hill
is illustrative. The purity of the institution of marriage must be maintained, said the Supreme
Court, for it "is the foundation of the family and of society, without which there would be neither
civilization nor progress." 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888). See also HOUGHTON, THE VICTORIAN
FRAME OF MIND 341-48 (1957).
14. Williams v. Williams, 299 N.C. 174, 188, 261 S.E.2d 849, 859 (1980). The case is proba-
bly the most important statement of policy in this area in several years. Interestingly enough, it is
the only case in North Carolina that discusses with apparent favor the concept of rehabilitative
alimony.
15. The wife's duty has always been legally unenforceable and therefore largely illusory,
except insofar as the consequences of breach were involved. The husband's duty is, as a practical
-matter, unenforceable as long as the parties live together.
16. The recent Supreme Court decision in Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979), which declared
unconstitutional on equal protection grounds a state statute under which only wives were eligible
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form the basic principle upon which many of the essential elements of mar-
riage are based. Most importantly, the need to enforce this duty of support has
provided the major policy rationale on which courts have sought to control
many aspects of marriage dissolution. 17 The roles imposed upon parties to
marriage by this concept of reciprocal duties are one of the major vehicles by
which marriage itself is denominated a status.
18
The concept itself is distinctly feudal in nature, its origins easily traceable
in England to the eleventh century and the Norman Conquest. 19 The ultimate
effect of the doctrine, in combination with other developments in the common
law, was rather simple. Stripped of her rights to own property or to contract in
her own name, her economic worth wholly subsumed into the marital unit, a
married woman received, as a quidpro quo, the right to depend upon her
husband for support.
20
This right to support was never absolute, however. For example, it was,
and is, largely unenforceable as long as the parties live together.21 More sig-
nificantly, the spouses' covenants were and are dependent, so that if any sepa-
ration of the parties were occasioned by the wife's breach of her duty, her
husband's duty to support her was extinguished. The doctrine of reciprocal
duties introduced to the English legal system at a very early time a model of
marital relations in which the fault of one party could relieve the other from
the performance of his or her duties. Only if the separation of the parties was
not the result of fault on the part of the wife, and was therefore (in the logic of
the day) the result of serious fault on the part of the husband, would the duty
to receive alimony, has wholly logical, but not necessary, implications for the continued validity of
gender-based support duties. See, for example, the discussion of the recent New York case of
Greschler v. Greschler, 71 A.D.2d 322, 422 N.Y.S.2d 718 (1979), at note 62 infra, where a statute
embodying such a classification was struck down on equal protection grounds. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 14-322, which makes a husband's abandonment of his wife without providing her with adequate
support a misdemeanor, also creates a gender specific duty of support and thus would appear to be
constitutionally infirm. The same concept of support could of course be embodied in sex neutral
classifications, accomplished in most alimony statutes by the use of terms like "supporting" and
"dependent" spouse. In most instances the practical effect would be the same-the husband
would continue to have the primary duty of support.
17. Were equal protection attacks successfully to undermine this concept, one of the major
policy obstacles to greater freedom to contract in separation agreements might be removed. See
text accompanying notes 62 & 65 infra.
18. The observation that marriage is moving from a matter of status to a matter of private
contract is familiar. The idea derives from the nineteenth century scholar Sir Henry Maine. One
of the hallmarks of a progressive society, he postulated, is that individual roles, initially a function
of status, become increasingly a function of private contract. H. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 170 (14th
ed. 1891).
19. Apparently the Normans grafted onto the existing system of law in England their own
concept of capatis dominutio minor, whereby the wife's legal identity was both literally and figura-
tively merged into that of her husband's. Though in later years this merger concept gave way in
Normandy to the more liberal influences of Roman and civil community property concepts,
England remained isolated from such continental developments. Johnston, Sex andProperty: The
Common Law Tradition, the Law School Currciulum, and Developments toward Equality, 47
N.Y.U.L. REv. 1033, 1044 (1972), & Sayre, A Reconsideration of Husband's Duty to Support and
Wfe's Duty to Render Services, 29 VA. L. REv. 857, 858 (1943).
20. Paulsen, Support Rights and Duties Between Husband and Wife, 9 VAND. L. REv. 709
(1956).
21. Id. at 719. See also Comment, Marital Property: A New Look at Old Inequities, 39 ALB.
L. REv. 52, 54 (1974).
1981]
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to support survive.22
Assuming that the duty of support did survive the separation, it could be
enforced in the English system in one of two ways: the wife could pledge the
husband's credit to provide herself with "necessaries," 23 or she could sue in
the ecclesiastical courts for a divorce a mensa el thoro.24 If the wife obtained
this limited form of divorce she became entitled to alimony-judicial enforce-
ment of her husband's duty to support throughout the remainder of the mar-
riage, presumably until one or the other party died.
25
In this country the doctrine of reciprocal duties was adopted quite early.
26
Given the absence of ecclesiastical courts here, however, and the availability,
albeit on restrictive grounds, of absolute divorce, the concept of alimony un-
derwent a necessary, though theoretically somewhat untenable, transforma-
tion. It remained a "statutory substitute for the marital right of support,
'27
despite the received law legacy that the duty of support could not survive the
absolute dissolution of a marriage, so that even in states where absolute di-
vorce was possible, alimony, either permanent or pendente lite, was available
to a wife. Whether it was actually decreed, and in what amounts, depended
almost solely upon the absence of the wife's fault in bringing about the separa-
tion of the parties.
28
This legacy of fault is both powerful and tenacious. Although currently
only ten states make marital- misconduct an automatic bar to the granting of
alimony, fault is still probably the single most relevant factor in setting the
22. Paulsen, supra note 20, at 716, & H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 184 (1968).
The Paulsen article has a particularly good discussion of the manner in which these models of
behavior led to the development of the fundamental fault approach to dissolution of marriage.
23. As Clark and many other commentators have noted, this was a woefully inadequate rem-
edy for afemme couvert. H. CLARK, supra note 22, at 189-192. Merchants were, and are, under-
standably reluctant to allow such credit transactions, as a husband could legally fail to honor any
demand for payment if the wife had been at fault in causing the separation, if he had already
provided her with funds for necessaries, or if the items for which his credit were pledged were not
in fact "necessaries."
24. H. CLARK, supra note 22, at 189-191; Paulsen, supra note 20, at 735. The divorce a mensa
et thoro, at a time when absolute divorce was virtually unknown, was simply a judicially sanc-
tioned separation-an authoritative pronouncement that a party's refusal to live with his or her
spouse was not unlawful. See also Rheinstein, Trends in Marriage and Divorce Law of Western
Countries, 18 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 3 (1953).
25. 1 W. NELSON, DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT § 14.02 (1945 & rev. ed. 1961), In the very
rare instances in which absolute divorce, or divorce a vincula was obtained, alimony was not avail-
able, because it was originally nothing more than an extension of the duty of support, the duty
itself being incident to an existing valid marriage. See Vernier & Hurlbut, The Historical Back-
ground ofAlimony Law and Its Present Statutory Structure, 6 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 197, 201
(1939). North Carolina preserved an interesting variation on this rule until 1967. See text accom-
panying note 206 infra. For similar reasons, alimony was never available to husbands: there
existed no duty of support in their favor from which the duty to pay alimony might derive. See
Kurtz, The State Equal RzghtsAmendments and Their Impact on Domestic Relations Law, 11 FAM.
L.Q. 101, 132 (1977).
26. J. BISHOP, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE AND SEPARATION § 1184 (1891).
27. 2 W. NELSON, supra note 25, at § 14.02. Alimony pendente lite, alimony without divorce,
and separate maintenance are entirely consistent with the original rationale under which alimony
was granted. For a discussion of the difficulties that some commentators have had with the lack of
theoretical consistence in permanent alimony awards after divorce, see Kurtz, supra note 25.
28. 2 W. NELSON, supra note 25, at § 14.02.
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level of support after separation or dvorce.29 That the concept of fault has
justly received vituperative criticism has not appreciably lessened reliance
upon it in determining the distributive consequences upon divorce.
30
In summary, the concept of reciprocal duties, regardless of the probability
of its continuing constitutional validity, is of crucial importance in several re-
spects. First, it continues to provide the theoretical models for marital part-
ners, any deviation from which carries serious economic consequences for the
breaching party.31 Second, it has helped to institutionalize, at a deep and per-
vasive level within our court systems, the role of fault in marriage dissolution.
This in turn has made the privately negotiated settlement a more attractive,
not to mention more humane, alternative.32 Finally, the duty of support and
its fault progeny continue to be major considerations in negotiating separation
agreements and so continue to form a large portion of the law in whose
shadow private settlements must be reached. It is to an examination of this
law in North Carolina that we may now turn.
29. Freed & Foster, supra note 2, at 306. Until quite recently, fault was also the overwhelm-
ingly dominant factor in determining whether or not divorce itself would be available and to
whom it would be granted. North Carolina is numbered among those ten states that make adul-
tery, the most serious example of marital fault, an absolute bar to receiving alimony. N.C. GEN.
STAT. 50-16.6(a) provides that "alimony or alimony pendente lite shall not be payable when adul-
tery is pleaded in bar of demand. . in an action or cross action, and the issue of adultery is
found against the spouse seeking alimony ....
30. Fault bears no necessary, or even likely relationship, to the economic or other contribu-
tions of either party to the marriage, nor to the level of economic need of either. Marital fault
bears even less relation to custodial considerations, a topic beyond the scope of this article. See
Paulsen, Support Rights, supra note 20, at 727; and Pilpel & Zavin, Separation Agreements, supra
note 4. That alimony awards are largely fault-based only increases the onerous nature of the
payments. For a devastating criticism of the psychological and sociological effects of alimony
awards, see Peele, Social and Psychological Effects of the Availability and Granting of 4limony on
the Spouses, 6 LAW & CONTEMP. PROS. 283, 284 (1939). The author aptly concludes that ali-
mony "perpetuates, in most instances, a relationship passionately undesired and in a way that
continues and even increases former antagonisms. . . . It easily becomes a sort of legal poultice
that draws to a head the underlying domestic poison that the decree is expected to drain
away.... Animosities that might otherwise have burnt out with the passing of time may be
rekindled each time a check is mailed." Id. at 283.
31. Paulsen, supra note 20, at 709-10.
32. The degree to which separation agreements become a more humane alternative to the
adversarial-fault system depends not only on the extent to which that system will allow the parties
freedom to contract. It is also dependent on the attorney's technical knowledge, his willingness to
be guided by considerations of fairness, and his sensitivities to the pschological difficulties of his
clients. To ignore that separation agreements, particularly if there are children involved, become
a sort of post-marital code by which the future relationships of the parties will to a great degree be
governed, is to defeat one of the major purposes of the agreement. For insightful discussions of
the psychological nature of the tasks a lawyer undertakes in domestic matters, see Watson, The
Lawyer as Counselor, 5 J. FAM. L. 7 (1965); Watson, Professionalizing the Lawyer's Role as Coun-
selor: Risk-Takingfor Rewards, 1969 LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 17; A. WATSON, PSYCHIATRY
FOR LAWYERS (1968); Redmount, Perception and Strategy in Divorce Counseling, 34 CONN. B.J.
249 (1960); and Spencer & Zaminmit, Mediation-Arbitration: A Proposalfor Private Resolution of
Disputes Between Divorced or Separated Parents, 1976 DuKE L.J. 911. As Watson says, this coun-
seling task may be "slighted or ignored, stumbling or skillful, effective or defeating, but it cannot
be avoided." Watson, The Lawyer as Counselor, 5 J. FAM. L. 7 (1965).
19811
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C Separation Agreements: History and Validity
1. Introduction
In order to avoid any unnecessary confusion in the discussion that fol-
lows, two distinctions should be made at the outset. The first is that between
separation agreements and consent judgments. For reasons that will be ex-
plained later, consent judgments have been used with particular frequency in
North Carolina,33 but with one or possibly two exceptions, the two types of
contracts are virtually identical.34 A consent judgment is basically nothing
more than a private contract between the parties that has been entered upon
the records of, and received the stamp of approval from a court.
35
A more crucial, and subtle, distinction that must be made is between a
separation agreement and a property settlement. In its simplest form, a sepa-
ration agreement is a contract between a husband and a wife stating that they
have agreed to live separate and apart and providing for marital support
rights.36 A property settlement, on the other hand, has nothing to do with the
support rights of a dependent spouse. It is an agreement that adjusts the rights
of the couple in real and personal property. Although these adjustments may
involve installment payments to the wife, they are not necessarily "support"
payments. 37 Such settlements may be entered into at any time, whether the
parties contemplate divorce or separation, and they may divide property in a
fashion that a court would be without power to order.
Operationally and analytically separation agreements and property settle-
ments, although often entered into simultaneously, are quite distinct-one
deals with property rights and the other with support rights.38 That the two
33. See text accompanying discussion at notes 205-09 infra.
34. Id.
35. 2 R. LEE, NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY LAW § 152, at 217. See also Stanley v. Cox, 253
N.C. 620, 632, 117 S.E.2d 826, 834 (1961). N.C. GEN. STAT. § IA-I Rule 68.1(a)(1967) provides
that: "A judgment by confession may be entered without action at any time in accordance with
the procedure prescribed by this rule. Such judgment may be for money due. . .. [S]uch judg-
ment may also be entered for alimony or for support of minor children." As a pratical matter a
consent judgment is often entered into after court proceedings have begun and the parties find that
they are, after all, able to reach agreement on matters of spousal and child support. A previously
negotiated separation agreement may also always be entered as a consent judgment.
36. 2 R. LEE, supra note 35, § 187, at 459. Customarily this agreement contains some provi-
sion for the support of the dependent spouse, a stipulation by that spouse, usually the wife, that
the provision is accepted in fulfillment of all support duties, a waiver of all other rights, and, if
there are children, provision for their custody and support. Id.
37. 2A. LIDEY,supra note 3, § 31, at 31-69, and 2 R. LEE,supra note 35, § 187, at 460, 463.
Particularly when there is a lump sum, payable in installments, it is often very difficult to distin-
guish between property and support provisions. The key lies not in the labels or characterizations
of the payments, but in the essential purpose for which they are made. See 1 A. LINDEY, supra
note 3, § 3, at 24 (Supp. 1981) and Clark, Searation Agreements, 28 ROCKY MT. L. REV. (Part I)
149, (Part II) 320, 332 (1955).
38. In general, the major distinctions between a property settlement and a separation agree-
ment, other than those already noted, are as follows: (1) provisions for periodic payments in a
separation agreement that is merged in a divorce decree usually may be modified by a court, but
payments in a property settlement may be modified only with the consent of the parties; (2) pay-
ments made to a wife under a separation agreement will usually qualify as alimony, and thus be
deductible to the husband and income to the wife, whereas payments made under a property
settlement are not deductible to the husband nor chargeable as income to the wife; (3) a reconcili-
[Vol. 59
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types of agreements are often inextricably confused within a single document,




The history of the development and recognition of separation agreements
presents an interesting object lesson in the triumph of private law over public
policy. In a neat turn of the phrase, it has been noted that through the vehicle
of separation agreements, divorce and its economic consequences have be-
come a "semi-bootleg affair" in which the courts play a minimum role.40 In
their origin, however, separation agreements were an almost wholly "bootleg"
affair. The same forces of public policy and judicial hostility that at one time
prohibited or restricted divorce also prohibited, then severely restricted, the
operation and effect of separation agreements.
41
Apart from judicial hostility to anything that might adversely affect the
indissoluble nature of marriage, the major theoretical stumbling block stand-
ing in the way of legal recognition of separation agreements was that of the
merger of the wife's identity into that of her husband. Above all else a separa-
tion agreement is a contract, and obviously one could not contract with one's
self.
4 2 Although the validity of these agreements had long been recognized on
the continent, they were wholly void in England until the end of the eighteenth
century.43 At about that time, however, Lord Mansfield undertook an almost
single-handed (and minded) campaign to establish the validity of the con-
tracts. His apparent success was undone in the early nineteenth century, again
on the familiar grounds that parties who are at law "but one person" may not
contract with each other.44 However, as one commentator explains:
ation and resumption of cohabitation will rescind the executory portions of a separation agree-
ment but will normally not affect a property settlement; (4) support payments under a separation
agreement will not normally survive the remarriage or death of the payee or death of the payor,
but payments made under a property settlement will survive these contingencies; and (5) pay-
ments made under a separation agreement that qualify as alimony wil not be discharged in bank-ruptcy, but liabilities under a property settlement may be. 1 A. LINDEY, supra note 3, § 3, at 3-23
to -24 (Supp. 1981).
39. See discussion accompanying notes 264-270 infra.
40. Pilpel & Zavin, supra note 4, at 33.
41. Many of the same attitudes are also evident in the development of antenuptial contracts,
a subject beyond the scope of this Article. Unlike separation agreements, however, antenuptial
contracts have long been favored by law. 2 A. LINDEY, supra note 3, § 90, at 90-28. The major
North Carolina cases treating the subject are McLean v. McLean, 237 N.C. 122, 74 S.E.2d 320
(1953); Turner v. Turner, 242 N.C. 533, 89 S.E.2d 245 (1955); Motley v. Motley, 255 N.C. 190, 120
S.E.2d 422 (1961); Lane v. Scarborough, 284 N.C. 407, 200 S.E.2d 622 (1973); and Harden v. First
Union Nat'l Bank, 28 N.C. App. 75, 220 S.E.2d 136 (1975).
42. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442 (1818): "By marriage, the husband and wife
are one person in law: that is, the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during
the marriage .... For this reason, a man cannot grant anything to his wife, or enter into cove-
nant with her, for the grant would be to suppose her separate existence: and to covenant with her,
would be only to covenant with himself .. "
43. Peaslee, Separation Agreements Under the English Law, 15 HARV. L. Rav. 638, 641
(1902). The detailed history that is recounted in this quaintly scholarly and thoroughly delightful
article is highly recommended.
44. Id. at 643-48.
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"Notwithstanding many rebuffs from the courts, the conveyancers persisted in
advising the use of the tabooed contract. There was practically no divorce
obtainable, and this sort of an armistice was the only relief to be had. .. .
Slowly but surely, in England and the United States, the inevitable recognition
of a device that continued to be in common use occurred. By 1888, even the
"decent regard for the old law" was abandoned, and parties were allowed to
contract directly with each other.46 "[Jiudicial sophistry" had won the day.47
However, while the "one person" stumbling block had been overcome, a
huge reservoir of judicial hostility to separation agreements remained. In the
first case that dealt with the issue in North Carolina, the supreme court came
to the following conclusion with clear outrage:
The relation of husband and wife is at the foundation of society
.... Incident to it are its inseparable. . . characteristics-its one-
ness--"they shall be no longer twain but one flesh," "to live together
after God's holy ordinance," . . . . In contravention of this policy,
and in disregard of their marriage vows, the parties in this case had
"difficulties" and separated; and to avoid the wholesome control of
the court, they entered into an agreement by which the property was
to be divided between them. . . and [they] were to live separately.
Such a course, if allowed, would virtually annul our marriage laws,
and make the relation of husband and wife a mere trade or bargain,
dependent upon their caprice.48
The court commented further that although this "evil" had been "fixed
upon society" in Europe, and that in England "too much property now de-
pends upon it to disturb it", it was not too late to eradicate the evil before it
could take root in North Carolina. Therefore, the court declared "articles of
separation" to be contrary to "law and public policy" and incapable of en-
forcement.
49
However, this pernicious attempt to contract, which threatened the very
foundation of civilized and moral society, continued hard on the heels of the
supreme court's disdain. In 1871 the legislature passed what is known as a
"Free Trader" statute. In apparent recognition of what must have already
been a common practice, the statute provided that any married woman "living
separate from her husband . . . under a deed of separation . . . shall be
deemed. . . a free trader."' 50 "Free trader" status allowed a woman to convey
her personal estate and her real estate without the consent of her husband.
And by 1905 the legislature had enacted the precursor to N.C. G.S. 52-6, the
famous "privy examination" statute.51
45. Id. at 651. It was during this period, and for these reasons, that the trustee device was
developed; whereby a husband or some party would convey property to a trustee who would
reconvey to, or-hold-in-trust for, the wife.
46. Id. at 656.
47. Id.
48. Collins v. Collins, 62 N.C. (Phil. Eq.) 153, 155-59 (1867).
49. Id. at 156-57, 159.
50. Law of February 12, 1872, ch. 193, § 23, 1871 N.C. PuB. LAWS 335-6.
51. Spencer v. Spencer, 37 N.C. App. 481, 486, 246 S.E.2d 805, 809 (1978). The Spencer case
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Because this privy examination statute, in effect until January 1, 1978, has
had an unexpectedly great impact on the judicial treatment of separation
agreements in this state,52 it deserves careful examination. In its final version,
not appreciably different from that in effect in 1905, the statute provided:
No contract between husband and wife made during their coverture
shall be valid to affect or change any part of the real estate of the
wife, ... for a longer time than three years next ensuing the making
of such contract, nor shall any separation agreement between hus-
band and wife be valid for any purpose, unless such contract or sepa-
ration agreement is in writing, and is acknowledged before a
certifying officer who shall make a private examination of the
wife .... 53
Further, it required that the examining officer incorporate into his certificate a
statement of his conclusions and findings as to whether the contract was "un-
reasonable or injurious" to the wife, and continued that the officer's certificate
"shall be conclusive of the facts therein stated but may be impeached for fraud
as other judgments may be."
54
Though the impact of this statute will be discussed more fully later, it is
clear that by 1905 separation agreements had achieved a legal, if unfavored,
status. By 1912 the supreme court begrudgingly admitted that it was "con-
strained to hold that public policy with us is no longer peremptory on this
question, and that under certain conditions these deeds are not void as a mat-
ter of law."55 Though this was hardly an enthusiastic endorsement of separa-
tion agreements, their validity "under certain conditions" was established
without question.56 Though several North Carolina cases continued, rather
has a thorough discussion of the history of this statute, which was then before the court on a
constitutional attack. The court of appeals explained that ". . . over the years, the legislature has
tried to limit the damage of G.S. 52-6 by passing curative statutes .... However, like Br'er
Rabbit and the Tar Baby, the legislature found itself unable to turn the wretched creature loose."
Id. at 488 n.2, 246 S.E.2d at 810 n.2. As will become obvious, the creature was wretched indeed as
far as its effects upon separation agreements in this state have been concerned.
52. Repealed. Act of May 13, 1977, ch. 375, § 1, 1977 N.C. SEss. LAWS, Ist Sess. 375.
53. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-6 (1976). G.S. 52-2 authorizes married persons to contract in re-
gard to real or personal property "in the same manner and with the same effect" as if unmarried.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-2 (1976). G.S. 52-10 specifically authorizes married persons or persons
about to be married to release or quitclaim rights in the property of the other that they might
acquire, or might have acquired, through marriage. G.S. 52-10.1 effective January 1, 1978, now
provides that "any married couple is hereby authorized to execute a separation agreement not
inconsistent with public policy, which shall be legal, valid and binding in all respects .... " N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 52-10 (1979). The entire chapter was rewritten in the later part of nineteenth cen-
tury after the adoption of article X, section 6 of the North Carolina Constitution, which removed
the former requirement that a conveyance of land by a wife could not be valid without the written
consent of her husband. 2 R. LEE, supra note 35, § 204, at 139 (1976 Cum. Supp.).
54. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-6(b) (1976) (repealed 1977) (emphasis added).
55. Archbell v. Archbell, 158 N.C. 408, 413, 74 S.E. 327, 329 (1912).
56. The .4rchbell court was not very helpful, however, in describing precisely what consti-
tuted the "certain conditions" under which separation agreements might be held valid in this state.
Clearly any deed of separation must have been executed in compliance with the privy examina-
tion statute. Beyond that, the court did approve some already well established requirements for
valid contracts between husband and wife. First, the instruments were "permissible" only "where
the separation has already taken place or immediately follows" and agreements for a future sepa-
ration would be void Id. at 414, 74 S.E. at 329. Second, the parties must be "moved to it by
adequate reasons". . . under circumstances of such character as to render it "reasonably neces-
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inexplicably as late as 1955, to comment that these contracts were "not favored
at law,"57 no court since Archbell has held an otherwise valid separation
agreement void on grounds of public policy. Today, of course, it is widely
recognized that separation agreements are much favored by law.58
The initial judicial hostility that surrounded the development of separa-
tion agreements did not, however, dissipate overnight. Presented with a kind
offalt accompli from the public, courts simply refocused their distrust: since
they could no longer forbid the making of these subversive contracts, they
would at least carefully restrict their execution, permissible scope, and opera-
tion. One of the major vehicles for the imposition of these restrictions was that
"will-o'-the-wisp of the law,"59 public policy.
3. Public Policy
It is obvious that all judicial or legislative attempts to control the sub-
stance or operation of separation agreements are to some degree matters of
public policy. More specifically, however, two propositions, each aimed at
preserving the integrity of marriage, have from the start been identified as
paramount issues of policy. They are that agreements will not be enforced if
they are made "in contemplation of divorce" or if they attempt to alter the
"essential elements" of marriage.60 The latter proposition brings us again to
the duty of support.
As we have already seen the duty of support is one of the most essential
incidents of marriage.61 The rule developed early, therefore, that a husband
could not circumvent by private contract an obligation that the laws of the
state had imposed upon him. Thus, any separation agreement that purported
to relieve a husband of this duty was void.62 If applied literally, however, this
sary" to the health or happiness of one or the other parties. Id. Third, the agreement would be
rescinded upon any resumption of conjugal relations. Id. at 416, 74 S.E. at 330. Fourth, upon a
divorce the agreement "in so far as it respects the property rights involved, should be respected by
the decree." Id. at 416, 74 S.E. at 330.
57. See, e.g., Taylor v. Taylor, 197 N.C. 197, 201, 148 S.E. 171, 173 (1929); Brown v. Brown,
205 N.C. 64, 69, 169 S.E. 818, 821 (1933); and Turner v. Turner, 242 N.C. 233, 235, 89 S.E.2d 245,
249 (1955).
58. 2 S. WILLISTON, LAW OF CONTRACTS § 270, at 121 (3d ed. W. Jaeger 1959); 1 W. NEL-
SON, supra note 25, § 13.07, at 492; and 2 A. LINDEY, supra note 3, § 15, at 15-85. The Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act clearly favors separation agreements. At § 306(a) it states: "To pro-
mote amicable settlement of disputes between parties to a marriage attendant upon their separa-
tion or the dissolution of their marriage, the parties may enter into a written separation agreement
containing provisions for disposition of any property ... ,maintenance of either of them, and
support, custody, and visitation of their children." For more complete discussions of the UMDA,
see Symposium, 18 S.D. L. REv. 531 (1973), and Note, Modfcation of Spousal Support. A Survey
ofa Confusing Area of the Law, 17 J. FAm. L. 711 (1978-79).
59. The phrase is from Waelihan v. Hughes, 196 Va. 117, 82 S.E.2d 553 (1954).
60. Weitzman, Legal Regluation ofMarriage- Tradition and Change, 62 CAL. L. REV. 1169,
1259 (1974).
61. See text accompanying notes 15-18 supra.
62. 15 S. WILL~roN, supra note 58, § 1742, at 71; 6A A. COR IN, CONTRACTS § 1474, at 618.
The statement does, however, deserve some qualification in view of the recent case of Greschler v.
Greschler, 71 A.D.2d 322, 422 N.Y.S.2d 718 (1979), in which the court struck down a statute
prohibiting agreements wherein a husband attempted to relieve himself of the duty of support, as
an impermissible gender classification. The case was rather unusual, however, as was New York's
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rule could mean that most separation agreements would violate public policy,
since one of their major functions is to dispense with the duty of support in
some fashion.
Two related rationales were developed to preclude this result. First, such
a contract was not "in derogation of the husband's support obligation; it
merely prescribe[d] the manner in which the obligation was to be met."' 63 Sec-
ond, the familiar principle that courts will not inquire into the adequacy of
consideration was applied to the contracts. 64 Policy, in brief, accommodated
itself to practical necessity and public need. The result was that separation
agreements, valid in other respects, which recited a perfunctory consideration
for the wife's relinquishment of her support rights, were held not to violate the
cardinal principle that the essential incidents of marriage may not be varied.6
5
It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the principle became a matter of
form, with little remaining in the way of substance.
Nor has the second major public policy principle-that a contract be-
tween a husband and wife reciting their intentions to live separate and apart
must not encourage, promote, or be made in consideration of divorce66 -fared
appreciably better. Significantly, this principle is the source of the well-ac-
cepted rule that agreements which look to a future separation are void and
that the separation must have already occurred or must occur shortly after the
agreement is entered into in order for the agreement to be valid.67 But except
for this derivative rule on the necessity for contemporaneous separation, this
policy is in most contexts rather meaningless today. By its very nature a sepa-
ration agreement tends to "promote" divorce, at least in the sense that it de-
creases the emotional and financial costs of dissolution.68 Moreover, the line
embodiment of this standard in statutory form. It is nonetheless a case of clear potential impor-
tance. See discussion at note 16 supra.
63. 2 A. LINDEY, supra note 3, § 15, at 15-85. See also H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELA-
TIONS § 16.4, at 529 (1968), and 2 R. LEE, supra note 35, § 188, at 393. The latter states that it is
"not contrary to public policy for a separation agreement, otherwise valid, to provide that the wife
release all her rights to support other than as expressly provided for in the agreement." Id
64. 1 W. NELSON, supra note 25, at § 13.17. In fact, mutual promises provide consideration
for each other in separation agreements, so that it is the husband's promise to provide support in
some form that supports the wife's release of her rights. Clark, supra note 37, at 152, points out
that separation agreements are almost never declared void for lack of consideration, concluding
that the requirement is used by courts only as a "convenient excuse for upsetting separation agree-
ments thought to be unfair to wives" and is, therefore, merely "a vestige of the age of chivalry."
See text accompanying notes 73-86 infra for discussion of the fairness requirement.
65. Clark, supra note 37, at 152. It is worth pointing out that, as a result of the relative
impotency of the policy restriction, any ultimate demise of the concept of the husband's duty of
support would have little effect on the law affecting separation agreements.
66. 1 A. LINDEY, supra note 3, § 3 (Supp. 1981); 1 W. NELSON, supra note 25, at § 13.17.
Included within this category of forbidden contracts are what are called "collusive" agreements in
which one promise toperform is conditioned upon the other promise to obtain a divorce or to
manufacture grounds for divorce; agreements that attempt to relieve the husband of his duty of
support or procure any other economic outcome that is thought to be so attractive as to be promo-
tive of divorce; and, occasionally, agreements in which one party promises to assist the other in
obtaining a divorce. Clark, supra note 37, at 150. See also 6A A. CORBIN, supra note 62, § 1494,
at 614.
67. Clark, supra note 37, at 150.
68. This accounts in part, of course, for the initial judicial hostility to the agreements.
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between "smart bargains" and "collusive bribes" is a thin one indeed.69 Occa-
sionally, clear cases of agreements that blatantly violate this principle are
presented. For instance, in an older North Carolina case the husband made
out notes to his wife that were to become payable only if the wife procured a
divorce within six months. 70 By and large, however, judging the validity of
separation agreements by their tendencies to promote divorce leaves us with,
in Homer Clark's words, "simply an unworkable standard. '71 Apparently,
only the most outrageous contracts will be invalidated on that basis.
Because of these developments, both of the policies, while not totally de-
void of meaning, have given way to more enlightened judicial and public atti-
tudes about marriage and divorce.72 As a result, judicial scrutiny has tended
to focus not on the forbidden functions of separation agreements but rather on
the more appropriate issue of their essential fairness.
4. Fairness
In the great majority of states it is clear that a separation agreement must
make provision for the wife's support that is "fair, just and reasonable in-view
of all the circumstances. '73 Although North Carolina courts have given con-
siderable lip service to the same rule, it is equally clear that no truly substan-
tive requirement of fairness actually exists in this state.74 No separation
agreement has ever been declared void on the grounds of unfairness in a
69. The phrase is from Comment, Diporce Agreements: Independent Contract or Incorpora.
tion in Decree, U. CHI. L. REv. 138, 142 (1954).
70. Pierce v. Cobb, 161 N.C. 300, 77 S.E. 762 (1913).
71. Clark, supra note 37, at 160. For a more detailed discussion of agreements that have been
held promotive of divorce, see Clark, id at 158-160, and I A. LINDEY, supra note 3, § 31 at 31-24
to -32.
72. The availability of unilateral divorce has also virtually eliminated the need for collusive
divorces, and many support duty problems are now subsumed by a fairness requirement. See
discussion that follows in the text.
73. 1 A. LINDEY, supra note 3, § 15, at 15-91. The author explains further that the best
statement of the rule is that when the agreement is fair on its face, there is a rebuttable presump-
tion of validity. Id § 15, at 15-92 to -93.
74. In Smith v. Smith, 225 N.C. 189, 34 S.E.2d 148 (1945), for instance, the supreme court
said that a separation agreement must be "reasonable, just and fair to the wife--having due regard
to the condition and circumstances of the parties at the time it was made." Id at 194, 34 S.E.2d at
151. This is the only case sinceArchbell that lists all the requirements for separation agreements
in North Carolina. The other requirements are that "(I) A separation must have already taken
place, or is to immediately follow [sic] the execution of the deed. (2) The separation agreement
must be made for an adequate reason, not for mere mutual volition or caprice, and under circum-
stances of such character as to render it reasonably necessary for the health or happiness of the
parties. . . . (3) [as stated above] [and] (4) in this State, the separation agreement must conform to
the statutory requirements, where property rights are involved. ... Id
Further, in Bunn v. Bunn, 262 N.C. 67, 136 S.E.2d 240 (1964), the most definitive case in
recent history on the operation and effect of separation agreements and property settlements, the
supreme court said that a consent judgment cannot be modified without the parties' consent "in
the absence of a finding that the agreement was unfair to the wife," or that her consent was
obtained by fraud. Id at 69, 136 S.E.2d at 242. In Van Every v. Van Every, 265 N.C. 506, 144
S.E.2d 603 (1965), the court stated, at 512, 144 S.E.2d at 609, that a "separation agreement in
which fair and reasonable provision is made for the wife will be upheld. . . ... if otherwise valid
and in compliance with the statutory requirements. See also Bowles v. Bowles, 237 N.C. 462, 465,
75 S.E.2d 413, 415 (1953).
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North Carolina court, 75 and in only one case was the absence of fair provision
in an agreement even mentioned.76 In fact, there was until recently a virtually
absolute prohibition against any factual inquiry into the fairness of an agree-
ment: the last sentence of the privy examination statute, that the examiner's
certificate "shall be conclusive of the facts therein stated but may be im-
peached for fraud . . . . ,77 was interpreted quite literally.78 Since agree-
ments almost always recited a "fair" consideration, further inquiry was
foreclosed. This was true despite the fact that the privy examination itself
became at an early date nothing more than a "perfunctory ceremony."
79
Probably as a result of this iron-clad rule, attempts to invalidate essen-
tially unfair agreements were channeled into fraud allegations. There too they
were almost always unsuccessful.80 The ironic result in either case was that
the very policy sought to be furthered by the privy examination was under-
mined by the courts' refusal to look beyond a perfunctory compliance with the
terms of the statute. It is rare indeed that a writer in this area complains of too
little state intervention.
With the repeal of the privy examination statute, however, there is no
reason to continue to regard the "requirement" of fairness as a mere shibbo-
leth.81 The development of a substantive fairness requirement should be en-
couraged. Unfortunately, separation agreements are often "negotiated" under
conditions of extraordinary stress. This is particularly true in states such as
North Carolina where abandonment is a grounds for alimony. The result is
often that a party refuses to leave the home until after the execution of a sepa-
ration agreement.8 2 This in turn puts pressure on at least one of the parties to
sign something quickly, and often only one party (the party seeking to leave) is
being represented by counsel. In short, the agreements may frequently be the
result of undue influence and overreaching, concepts with which courts deal
75. This point was made in Note, Separation Agreements In North Carolina, 2 N.C.L. Rv.
192, 195 (1924) and again in 1963 in 2 R. LEE, supra note 35, § 190, at 393. The same observation
may safely be made about cases arising since that time.
76. In Eubanks, v. Eubanks, 273 N.C. 189, 195, 159 S.E.2d 562, 567 (1968), the court men-
tioned that the separation agreement was "grossly unfair" to the wife, but the agreement was set
aside on the ground that the wife was a minor and could elect to avoid the contract on that basis.
The case is fully discussed at note 93 infra.
77. See note 54 supra.
78. The certificate of the officer could be attacked on the grounds of (1) fraud, (2) no appear-
ance before the officer, no examination, or improper certificate, (3) forgery or (4) mental incapac-
ity or infancy; but on the issue of reasonableness or fairness, the certificate was indeed
"conclusive.' In re Estate of Loftin, 285 N.C. 717, 208 S.E.2d 670 (1974). The list itself might
appear to be an expansion of the statutory grounds of fraud, but in fact it is simply the result of the
application of normal contract and fraud rules to separation agreements.
79. 2 R. LEE, supra note 35, § 190, at 398.
80. See text accompanying notes 95-100 infra.
81. More recent cases have continued to repeat the requirement. In Cox v. Cox, 36 N.C.
App. 573, 576, 245 S.E.2d 94, 96 (1978), the court of appeals, holding that there was no need for a
finding of dependency to support a consent judgment, said "[r]ather, a consent judgment should
be examined more generally to see if it is fair, if it does not contradict statutory or judicial policy."
82. A valid separation agreement, the terms of which are being performed, may be a bar to
alimony, alimony pendente ite, and counsel fees. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.6 (b). See also text
accompanying notes 139-141 infra.
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readily in other contexts, and which they should be even less hesitant to adopt
in an area so fraught with the potential for unfair or coercive bargaining.
Nor would the imposition of this review standard, upon a proper showing
by the party seeking to have part or all of the agreement set aside on grounds
of unfairness, impose any appreciably greater restrictions upon the parties'
freedom to contract than is common already in other contexts.8 3 The Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act, which generally places the highest value upon free-
dom to contract, takes just this approach. Section 306(b) of that Act provides:
In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage or for legal separation,
the terms of a separation agreement, except for those providing for
the support, custody, and visitation of children, are binding upon the
court unless it finds after considering the economic circumstances of
the parties and any other relevant evidence produced by the parties,
on their own motions or on request of the court, that the separation
agreement is unconscionable.
84
Additionally, the Act provides that if the court finds the agreement to be un-
conscionable, it may either request the parties to submit a revised agreement
or it may devise its own orders for property, maintenance, and support.
85
With the repeal of the privy examination statute and its conclusive effect
on findings of reasonableness and fairness, there exists for the first time in this
state the opportunity for courts to refuse to become parties to overreaching or
unfair separation agreements. As has been noted previously, existing case law
already provides the means by which the standard could be imposed. The
opportunity for courts to write upon an almost clean slate is rather unique.86
5. Fraud, Undue Influence, and Duress
The general standards relating to fraud and marital contracts developed
at a time when the husband was presumed to be the dominant party to a mar-
riage, so that courts felt a special duty to be solicitious of the wife's welfare.
87
One manifestation of this attitude was the presumption that a confidential re-
83. For cases applying the rule that separation agreements are to be governed by the same
principles as any other contract, see Bowles v. Bowles, 237 N.C. 462, 75 S.E.2d 413 (1953); Lane v.
carborough, 284 N.C. 407, 200 S.E.2d 622 (1973); and Pope v. Pope, 38 N.C. App. 328, 248
S.E.2d 260 (1978).
84. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE AcT § 306(b). Regarding this provision, Max
Rheinstein has commented that it is "well meant and probably indispensable, but the extent to
which a separation agreement will actually be scrutinized by the judge of an overcrowded divorce
court on his own motion is obvious." Rheinstein, Division of MaritalProperly, 12 WILL. L.J. 413,
437 (1976).
85. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 306(c). It is also interesting to note that in the
analogous area of antenuptial agreements, in which courts have traditionally -been no less wary,
fairness is at least an alternative criteria in determining the validity of such agreements, that is,
there must be either substantive fairness or full disclosure at the time the agreement was made.
See Haskell, The Premarital Estate Contract and Social Policy, 57 N.C.L. REV. 415 (1979).
86. Ironically, cases in states that have a history of a fairness requirement are often so laden
with "confusion and inconsistency" that they are perhaps, as Clark suggests, explicable only as
"lapses by the courts into moral indignation as a substitute for thought." H. CLARK, supra note
63, § 16.2, at 523. North Carolina is at least unburdened by such confusing precedents.
87. As one case delicately summed up the situation, "the special and intimate relation of the
marital bond... might place in the hands of the husband a weapon to be improperly used for his
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lationship existed between a husband and wife until, and sometimes beyond,
the time they separated.88 Because this presumption imposes upon the parties
a duty of utmost good faith, an expanded definition of fraud developed in
most jurisdictions, allowing separation agreements to be set aside on grounds
that would not otherwise suffice to void a contract.
8 9
More specifically, it is this confidential relationship that imposes a duty of
full disclosure on the dominant party and invites close judicial scrutiny of any
transaction between a husband and wife.90 Determining when this relation-
ship ceases to exist, therefore, is a crucial issue. It is universally held that the
presumption that the relationship exists is not applicable when the parties are
dealing at arm's length.91 And, although there is considerable disagreement
among the states as to what circumstances will rebut the presumption, Profes-
sor Lindey states that the fiduciary obligation does not generally cease until
the circumstances of the husband and wife "are such as to preclude the possi-
bility of imposition."
92
Although North Carolina recognizes most of the same general rules re-
garding the confidential relationship, 93 courts here clearly have taken a con-
siderably more "hard line" approach, at least when separation agreements are
involved. For example, mere separation of the parties will not ordinarily dis-
solve the confidential relationship. In North Carolina, however, it has been
said that even the intention to separate after execution of a separation agree-
ment will dissolve the confidential relationship.
94
own advantage." Ducas v. Guggenheimer, 90 Misc. 191, 153 NYS 591, 594 (1915), afrd. 173 App.
Div. 884, 157 NYS 801 (1916).
88. 1 A. LINDEY, supra note 3, § 37, at 37-9 to -10; 1 W. NELSON, supra note 25, § 13.17, at
498.
89. Separation agreements have, for instance, been set aside when economic necessity forced
the wife to execute the contract. I A. LINDEY, sufpra note 3, § 31, at 31-10. See also Clark, supra
note 37, at 154.
90. Clark, supra note 37, at 155, and 1 A. LINDEY, supra note 3, § 3, at 20.
91. Regardless of the relationship, however, Lindey says that the following standards should
always be imposed upon a separation agreement: (a) the husband must exercise the utmost good
faith in the course of negotiations; (b) he must make a full and frank disclosure of all material
facts; (c) the provision for the wife must be fair and reasonable in light of all the circumstances,
and (d) the transaction must be free from any fraud, duress, undue influence, or overreaching of
any kind. 1 A. LINDEY, supra note 3, § 3, at 3-23.
92. 2 id. § 37, at 37-10.
93. In a leading case, Eubanks v. Eubanks, 273 N.C. 189, 159 S.E.2d 562 (1968), the supreme
court said that, in order to be valid, a separation agreement must be "untainted by fraud, must be
in all respects fair, reasonable and just, and must have been entered into without coercion or the
exercise of undue influence, and with full knowledge of all the circumstances, conditions, and
rights of the contracting parties." Id. at 196, 159 S.E.2d at 567. Surprisingly, Eubanks is one of
the very few cases that even mentions "full and fair disclosure" standards. It is also an outrageous
case on its facts. The husband was eight years older than his minor wife. Shortly after the parties
had a child, they separated and the wife, then seventeen and under intensive psychiatric care, was
staying with her mother. The husband came to take her to a doctor's appointment and took her
then directly from the psychiatrist to his lawyers office, where he pressured her into signing a
separation agreement she had never seen before. Under the agreement she waived all her rights as
a result of the marriage in return for a "lump sum" of one hundred dollars. The court had an
embarassment of riches in deciding upon which ground to use for voiding the contract, but settled
upon the right of an infant to disaffirm. Id at 195, 159 S.E.2d at 567.
94. Lee, for instance, states unequivocably that once the husband and wife have separated or
even if "they intend to do so immediately following the execution of the separation agreement,
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Additionally, in the majority of jurisdictions the wife's representation by
counsel is, logically enough, a significant factor tending to rebut any presump-
tion of confidentiality, or inference of fraud or undue influence.95 In this state,
however, representation of a wife by an attorney serves almost conclusively to
rebut the presumption, so that any ensuing agreement is virtually immune to
attack based on fraud, duress, or undue influence.
96
Nor has North Carolina adopted any rule concerning the absence of in-
dependent counsel for the wife in this context. Several jurisdictions have be-
gun to raise some inference of fraud, unfairness, or overreaching when the
weaker party is unrepresented,97 and in general the lack of independent legal
advice is a very important factor in the issue of voluntary execution.9" In
North Carolina, however, when a dependent spouse is unrepresented, the
courts have gone no further than adopting the standard contract rule of con-
struction that when there is ambiguity in the contract, it will be construed to
resolve any doubts against the party responsible for its drafting.99
The reasons for this development, or lack thereof, in North Carolina are
not clear, but it is difficult to resist the conclusion that the privy examination
there exists between them no longer a confidential relationship." 2 R. LEE, supra note 35, § 191, at
399. See also Brown v. Brown, 205 N.C. 64, 169 S.E. 818 (1933). But see the more recent case of
Link v. Link, 287 N.C. 181, 179 S.E.2d 697 (1971), discussed at notes 102-107 infra. Clearly,
moreover, this position does not speak to the opportunities for overreaching that the confidential
relationship doctrine seeks to avoid.
95. 2 A. LINDEY, supra note 3, § 37, at 37-22.
96. The general rule in North Carolina is stated as follows: "[w]hen the wife employs an
attorney and, through him, deals with her husband as an adversary, the confidential relationship
between husband and wife no longer exists ... [and] no presumption arises that the husband has
exercised a dominant influence over the wife during such negotiations." Joyner v. Joyner, 264
N.C. 27, 32, 140 S.E.2d 714, 719 (1965). In one case the supreme court went so far as to distin-
guish, not merely the presence, but the quality of the representation: the "eminence, experience,
and character" of the attorney who represented the wife in a property settlement "bear directly on
her subsequent attempt to set it aside as fraudulent." Van Every v. Van Every, 265 N.C. 506, 511,
144 S.E.2d 603, 606 (1965).
In another case the wife alleged that she was under sedation when she signed the separation
agreement. Her complaint was, to say the least, insufficient in several respects, but the court held
that the presence of her attorney would negate incompetency even if she were under sedation,
Calhoun v. Calhoun, 7 N.C. App. 509, 511, 172 S.E.2d 894, 896 (1970). And in Fletcher v. Fletch-
er, a finding of duress was sustained, but the facts in the case were extreme: the wife was not
represented by an attorney, the husband had made several threats to kill her if she did not sign,
and the door to the certifying officer's office was left open during her examination, so that both the
husband and his attorney were in full view of the wife. 23 N.C. App. 207,210,208 S.E.2d 524, 527
(1974). See also Winborne v. Winborne, 41 N.C. App. 756, 255 S.E.2d 640 (1979), in which the
court held that the fact that the wife had an attorney negated any duty to disclose on her hus-
band's part.
97. See, e.g., Jensen v. Jensen, 97 Idaho 922, 557 P.2d 200 (1976), in which a separation
agreement was set aside when it was oppressive to the husband and he had not been represented
by independent counsel; and Gigele v. Gigele, 64 Ill. App. 3rd 136, 380 N.E.2d 1144 (1978), in
which an agreement (antenuptial) was set aside because the wife was not informed of her right to
independent counsel.
98. 2 A. LINDEY supra note 3, § 37, at 37-23.
99. See, e.g, McKnight v. McKnight, 25 N.C. App. 246,212 S.E.2d 902 (1975), and Krickhan
v. Krickhan, 34 N.C. App. 363, 238 S.E.2d 184 (1977). That the wife was not represented by an
attorney has clearly made some difference in several cases: Eubanks v. Eubanks, 273 N.C. 189,
159 S.E.2d 562 (1968); Link v. Link, 278 N.C. 181, 179 S.E.2d 697 (1971), discussed in text accom-
panying notes 101-106 infra; and Soper v. Soper, 29 N.C. App. 95, 223 S.E.2d 560 (1976). But
apparently no case has based its holding on the absence of independent counsel.
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statute may have again retarded the growth of strict standards regarding fraud
and separation agreements. This would be doubly ironic since the statute was
intended to protect married women from presumptively dominant husbands
and since it specifically allowed for challenges based on fraud. 1°° An appeal
for fairness, however, is the essence of any claim that an agreement be set
aside on the grounds of fraud, undue influence, or duress, and, as noted previ-
ously, fairness has never been a viable criteria for judging the validity of sepa-
ration agreements. It is likely that the conclusive statutory presumption that
an agreement was fair has for decades made any allegation of fraud difficult to
prove.
One supreme court case, however, suggests what may be a new judicial
attitude toward the closely related areas of fraud and fairness. In Link v. Link
the wife confessed to her husband an adulterous relationship. He immediately
moved out of the house. A few days later he presented her with an ultimatum:
if she signed over to him her solely owned stocks and debentures, she could
keep the children and he would agree to provide support for them; otherwise,
he would sue for ciistody.101 Without an attorney of her own, and without
consideration, the wife made the transfer and later sought to have it set aside.
The jury found duress and held that the transfer should be set aside; the court
of appeals reversed. The supreme court, in an opinion that may portend a
significant and welcome change in this area, reinstated the jury's verdict.
First, and most significantly, the court held that "the fact that the transactions
here in question occurred after the defendant's departure from the home...
did not show the previously established confidential relationship between
them had terminated so as to free the defendant to deal with the plaintiff as if
they were strangers.102 Though the court did not indicate the conditions
under which the confidential relationship would have been terminated, the
holding that mere physical separation of the parties did not destroy the rela-
tionship, at least in this context, is a significant change from prior law.
Second, the Link opinion, following what is clearly the majority ap-
proach10 3 in other states, looked closely at the individual circumstances of the
parties. Given that the husband had a wealth of business experience and was
president and manager of a successful closely held corporation and that the
wife had no business experience and was under great emotional stress, the
court held that the duty of disclosure was especially great.1
°4
Finally, the court distinguished this case from previous fraud or duress
cases involving separation agreements:' 05
100. See note 77 supra.
101. Link v. Link, 278 N.C. 181, 179 S.E.2d 697 (1971).
102. Id at 193, 179 S.E.2d at 704.
103. See cases and authorities cited by the court in Link, 278 N.C. at 194, 179 S.E.2d at 705.
104. Id at 193, 179 S.E.2d at 704.
105. Joyner v. Joyner, 264 N.C. 27, 140 S.E.2d 714 (1965) and Jones v. Jones, 261 N.C. 612,
135 S.E.2d 554 (1964) were similar types of cases. In Joyner, however, the wife was represented by
an attorney, and this was decisive. In Jones the husband had threatened not to provide for the
wife and children, and the supreme court held that his duty to support the children could have
been enforced by law, so that there was no duress. Id at 613, 135 S.E.2d at 555.
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An announcement by a husband, to whom the wife has confessed her
adultery, that he intends to separate from her and to institute legal
proceedings to obtain the sole custody of their children would not,
per se, constitute duress when the transaction induced by such state-
ment of intent was the execution of a separation and custody ar-
rangement. [citations omitted] The situation is completely different,
however, when the threat to take the children from the wife is for the
purpose of coercing her into transferring, without consideration, her
individual property to the husband, the proposal being to leave the
children in her custody if she make such transfer. 10 6
It would be wrong to conclude from this that the distinction which the court is
drawing is between a transfer of property induced by duress and the execution
of a separation agreement induced by duress. The real distinction lies not in
the type of transaction or even in the lawfulness of the threat, but rather in the
motive that underlies the threat. "[A] threat to institute legal proceedings...
which might be justifiable, per se, becomes wrongful within the meaning of
this rule if made with the corrupt intent to coerce a transaction grossly unfair to
the victim and not related to the subject of such proceedings.'
10 7
The principles adopted in Link are of great importance within the context
of marital contracts. If judicial scrutiny may now focus not on the legality of
the threat but on the end which that threat seeks to accomplish, then it is
possible that many fundamentally unfair separation agreements (often in-
duced by, for instance, threats to sue for custody) would be subject to chal-
lenge on grounds of duress. And beyond this, the court's holding that a mere
separation of the parties does not, without more, destroy the confidential rela-
tionship between husband and wife, is quite significant. In each instance a
marked and welcome change in North Carolina law is evident.
In summary, there is clearly reason to hope that North Carolina courts,
unfettered at last from the prohibitionary restraints of the conclusive effect of
the privy examination, can begin to develop consistent, coherent, and equita-
ble standards for judging the fairness and freedom from fraud of separation
agreements. For too long the paradoxical effect of that statute was to provide
a kind of judicial immunity to agreements that were unfair, smacked of over-
reaching or duress, or, for whatever reasons, were unconscionable.
6. Reconciliation
One of the more interesting examples of the tensions that may be pro-
duced by competing state policies is reflected in the rules regarding the effect
of reconciliation between the parties on an executory separation agreement.108
106. Link v. Link, 278 N.C. 181, 195, 179 S.E.2d 697, 705 (1971).
107. Id at 194, 179 S.E.2d at 705 (emphasis added).
108. Executed provisions of a separation agreement will not be affected by a resumption of
marital relations. For an interesting application of this rule in North Carolina, see Potts v. Potts,
24 N.C. App. 673, 211 S.E.2d 815 (1975), in which the court of appeals held that when a wife
collected a lump sum alimony payment, later reconciled with her husband, then separated again
and sued for alimony, the reconciliation had not rescinded the prior alimony waiver.
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The general rule, from which there is no dissent, is that "voluntary resumption
of cohabitation ... terminates all executory provisions in a bargain for sepa-
ration."' 109 The policies that underlie this rule are also relatively clear. Once a
reconciliation has occurred, the essential incidents of the marriage relationship
may be in no way controlled or affected by private contract. 0 Of course, it is
also a major policy of all states to encourage reconciliations.
The problem lies, however, not in the statement or application of the gen-
eral rules or policies but rather in determining precisely what conduct will
constitute a reconciliation. I I It is at this point that apparently consistent state
policies may, and in North Carolina emphatically do, conflict.1 2. The crucial
issue boils down to whether "isolated acts of sexual intercourse" between the
parties will amount to a reconciliation. The issue is hardly a frivolous one,
especially in a jurisdiction such as North Carolina, where a separation agree-
ment has been impossible to void because of unfairness and almost as difficult
to void on fraud grounds. Under these circumstances, a spouse may seek to
entice his or her partner into sexual relations solely in order to rescind their
agreement.
It is because of the potentially drastic, and unintended, results that may
follow upon sexual relations after the execution of an agreement that the nor-
mal judicial attitude is one of caution and restraint. The majority of jurisdic-
tions require a "voluntary resumption of marital cohabitation in the fullest
sense. . . [including] living together as husband and wife [and] having sexual
relations: and the general rule is that isolated acts of sexual intercourse, with-
out more, are insufficient to establish that a reconciliation has occurred."
'" 3
Clearly, this is as it should be. As Professor Wadlington has noted, in a fine
109. 15 S. WILLISTON, supra note 58, § 1743, at 76-77. See also 1 A. LINDEY, supra note 3,
§ 15, at 15-133. The converse of the rule is also true: so long as an agreement remains executory,
it is revocable by the parties, either expressly or by implication.
110. It is also true that living separate and apart is an essential part of the consideration sup-
porting the contract, and if the consideration fails, the contract is void and unenforceable. 1 A.
LINDEY, supra note 3, § 7, at 7-4; and 2 R. LEE, supra note 35, § 200. It is for this reason that a
property settlement is not normally affected by a resumption of marital relations: it deals with
property and not support rights, so that living apart furnishes no part of the consideration for the
agreement. See note 38 supra and 2 R. LEE, supra note 35, at 422. The parties may always elect to
rescind the unexecuted provisions of a property settlement after a reconciliation.
11. Parties may revoke the unexecuted provisions of a separation agreement expressly, but
with reconciliation the revocation always occurs by implication through their conduct. That a
court may draw implications from their conduct that does not at all accord with their actual inten-
tions is precisely the problem.
112. North Carolina does follow the general rules. In a major case, Jones v. Lewis, 243 N.C.
259, 261, 90 S.E.2d 547, 549 (1955), the supreme court said that: "It is well established in this
jurisdiction that where a husband and wife enter into a separation agreement and thereafter be-
come reconciled and renew their marital relations, the agreement is terminated for every purpose
in so far as it remains executory. . . Even so, a reconciliation and resumption of marital relations
by the parties ... would not revoke or invalidate a duly executed deed of conveyance in a prop-
erty settlement between parties. See also In re Estate of Adamee, 291 N.C. 386, 391, 230 S.E.2d
54, 545 (1976), where the court stated that ". . . a separation agreement between husband and
wife is terminated for every purpose insofar as it remains executory upon their resumption of the
marital relations"; Hutchins v. Hutchins, 260 N.C. 628, 133 S.E.2d 459 (1963); Reynolds v. Reyn-
olds, 210 N.C. 554, 187 S.E. 768 (1936); Murphy v. Murphy, 295 N.C. 390, 245 S.E.2d 693 (1978);
and Campbell v. Campbell, 234 N.C. 188, 66 S.E.2d 672 (1951).
113. Clark, supra note 37, at 170. Lindey says that "if the parties have engaged in sexual acts,
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example of understatement, if "one of the purposes of the separation require-
ment is to foster reconciliations, severe limitations on sexual contacts between
the parties would seem counterproductive."
' " 4
The North Carolina rule on what constitutes a reconciliation has devel-
oped in a fashion that is somewhat confusing and has produced a result that is
virtually byzantine. In one of the earlier major cases, the supreme court re-
soundingly endorsed the rule that sexual intercourse would void an agree-
ment: were the rule otherwise, the court said, a separation agreement would
"degenerate into a mere cloak or device by means of which the husband would
escape the responsibilities imposed by the marital status and yet be free to
partake of such privileges as he chose to enjoy."' 11s In clear indignation, the
court continued: "Manifestly, it is not to be assumed that the law would pro-
tect the integrity of the agreement, and yet thereby sanction and approve, for
all practical purposes, illicit intercourse and promiscuous assignation."
116
In 1932 this result was not surprising, and indeed was the conclusion of
the majority ofjurisdictions. Change came slowly, however. Less understand-
able was the continued espousal of this view in dictum in a 1955 decision."
17
Twenty years later an enlightened retrenchment from this position was sig-
naled by the court of appeals in Newton v. Williams. In Newton both parties
stipulated that since the time of the execution of the agreement they had fre-
quently engaged in sexual intercourse, spent nights together, and stayed in the
same house." 8 The wife, however, testified that at no time had she enter-
tained any intention to resume a full marital relationship. Without comment-
ing upon the substantive issue, the court of appeals reversed a summary
judgment for the wife on the grounds that there was conflicting evidence."t 9
Two years later, the court of appeals confronted the matter head on. In
Cooke v. Cooke, a wife counterclaimed, in her husband's suit for divorce, for
alimony and support due under a separation agreement. 120 In defense the
husband countered that the agreement was void because the parties had at-
the circumstances must be such to support the inference that normal family life has been re-
sumed." 1 A. LINDEY, § 8, at 8-17.
114. Wadlington, Sexual Relations after Separation or Divorce: The New Morality and the Old
and New Divorce Laws, 63 VA. L. REv. 249, 259 (1977).
115. State v. Gossett, 203 N.C. 641, 644, 166 S.E. 754, 755 (1932). The facts of the case were
that the husband was indicted for non-support of his wife. As a defense he alleged a duly exe-
cuted separation agreement with which he had continued to comply. This was countered with
evidence from the wife that her husband had continued to visit her after their separation, and that
they had had sexual intercourse on several occasions. Affirming a guilty verdict by the trial court,
the supreme court held that the separation agreement had been rescinded by such conduct and
was therefore not a defense to the nonsupport charge.
116. Id
117. In Jones v. Lewis, a 1955 case, the issue was not directly presented, but the court appar-
ently treated a wife's allegation that her husband had spent a single night with her several months
after the separation agreement was executed, as a sufficient allegation of reconciliation. 243 N.C.
259, 90 S.E.2d 547 (1955).
118. 25 N.C. App. 527, 214 S.E.2d 285 (1975). The wife in this case sued for specific perform-
ance under a separation agreement which called for the quitclaim of properties, and thehusband
defended on the ground that the agreement had been rescinded by a reconciliation.
119. Id at 531-32, 214 S.E.2d at 287-88.
120. 34 N.C. App. 124, 237 S.E.2d 323, cert. denied, 293 N.C. 592, 241 S.E.2d 513 (1977).
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tempted reconciliation and had engaged in sexual intercourse at least twice
since the execution of the agreement. In affirming the judgment below for the
wife, the court of appeals found that "the averments in plaintiffs affidavit are
not sufficient to raise the defense of reconciliation." 121 The court, frustrated in
its efforts to find a precise definition of "reconciliation" in North Carolina
cases, relied upon holdings from other jurisdictions that a finding of reconcili-
ation must be based upon "more than mere causal acts of sexual inter-
course."'122 The court concluded that the sexual contact between the parties
constituted "only a temporary resumption of marital relations on a trial basis
without the intent to resume a full marital relationship, or to repudiate the
separation agreement."'
123
This victory for the modem approach was short-lived. A 1978 case, Mur-
phy v. Murphy, presented the following facts. 124 A husband and wife sepa-
rated, executed a separation agreement in 1972, and, by the admissions of
both, had sexual intercourse "several" times between the time of the execution
of the agreement and the husband's suit for divorce. They had not, however,
ceased at any time to live separate and apart. The wife sought to have the
agreement set aside on the grounds that the parties had "reconciled." The jury
below was instructed that "'to become reconciled and renew their marital re-
lationship'" meant more than intercourse, and "that there must be a mutual
intent to resume cohabitation" and found for the husband. The court of ap-
peals affirmed, and the wife appealed. The supreme court precisely stated the
issue: ". . . whether a husband and wife who, after having executed a separa-
tion agreement and established separate abodes, continue to engage in sexual
intercourse from time to time thereby rescind the agreement."'
125
The supreme court recognized that the court of appeals, here and in ear-
lier cases, had enunciated and applied the majority rule. However, dipping
into its archival past, it went on to resurrect the rule it had adopted in 1932.126
The majority rule, it said emphatically, "is not the law in North Carolina. The
rule in this State was clearly enunciated ...in the case of State v. Gos-
sett. . ."127 Despite the passage of forty-six years, the court continued, it
was "still constrained to hold that sexual intercourse between a husband and
wife after the execution of a separation agreement avoids the contract."
It is impossible, and useless, to speculate about what prompted the
supreme court to rule as it did in Murphy. Certainly it would have been diffi-
cult for the court to have implied an intent to reconcile and resume marital
relations from isolated acts of sexual intercourse. An attempt to reconcile
could well be implied, but hardly a fully formed intent. 128 The result of the
121. Id at 126, 237 S.E.2d at 324.
122. Id 237 S.E.2d at 325.
123. Id at 127, 237 S.E.2d at 325.
124. 34 N.C. App. 677, 239 S.E.2d 597 (1977).
125. Murphy v. Murphy, 295 N.C. 390, 394, 245 S.E.2d 693, 696 (1978).
126. See text accompanying notes 115-116 supra.
127. Murphy v. Murphy, 295 N.C. 390, 395, 245 S.E.2d 693, 697 (1978).
128. Id at 397, 245 S.E.2d at 698, (Exum, J., dissenting).
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holding is that parties (or at least one party) will be penalized for trying to
reconcile if he or she is unsuccessful in that attempt. The conclusion that this
result tends to inhibit efforts to reconcile seems inescapable.
129
Ironically, the Murphy case leaves North Carolina in the unique position
of being the only state to embrace what is in effect an "either/or" standard for
what constitutes a reconciliation. The other half of this question is supplied by
a 1976 supreme court case, In re Estate of Adamee, in which the parties had
resumed living in the same house, due to the husband's poor health, but had at
no time engaged in intimate relations. 130 In holding that the separation agree-
ment was void, the supreme court said:
We hold that when separated spouses who have executed a separa-
tion agreement resume living together in the home which they occu-
pied before the separation, they hold themselves out as man and wife
"in the ordinary acceptation of the descriptive phrase." Irrespective
of whether they have resumed sexual relations, in contemplation of
law, their action amounts to a resumption of marital cohabitation
which rescinded their separation agreement insofar as it had not
been executed.
131
TheAdamee case is clearly a sensible result. As the court explained, sepa-
ration "means cessation of cohabitation, and cohabitation means living to-
gether as man and wife, though not necessarily implying sexual relations.'
3 2
When juxtaposed with the result in Murphy, however, the conclusion is una-
voidable: either sexual relations or the resumption of marital cohabitation
will void a separation agreement in North Carolina. As noted previously, this
result is unique.
The court of appeals has had considerable difficulty adjusting to the Mur-
phy decision. For example, in Hand v. Hand, a 1980 case, the court of appeals
decided a case in which a husband had been cited with contempt for failure to
make alimony payments in accord with a separation agreement.' 33 He con-
tended that he was under no obligation to make the payments, alleging that
the parties had abrogated their prior agreement by resuming cohabitation for
a brief period following the signing of the agreement. The wife admitted that
129. At the most basic and practical level, the Murphy holding means that North Carolina
attorneys must continue in their fairly barbaric warnings to their clients to keep away from the
other spouse at all costs. Understandably, such warnings leave parties quite suspicious of what
might in fact be a genuine attempt to effect a reconciliation by the other spouse.
130. In re Estate of Adamee, 291 N.C. 386, 230 S.E.2d 541 (1976). InAdamee a couple exe-
cuted a separation agreement, and a consent judgment based on it was entered in December, 1973.
In January of 1974 the wife moved back into the marital home and lived with her husband until
his death a short time later. Evidence as to how fully the marital relationship was resumed was
conflicting, but there was no question that the parties had resumed cohabitation. The husband's
heirs at law, who contended that the wife was barred by the separation agreement from adminis-
tering the estate of the deceased, said there was no intent to resume a marital relationship and that
the petitioner wife had simply moved back in to care for a dying man. The wife insisted that the
couple had resumed their marital relationship, but it was clear that the parties had not resumed
sexual relations, nor had they even slept in the same room.
131. Id at 392-93, 230 S.E.2d at 546.
132. Id at 392, 230 S.E.2d at 546.
133. 46 N.C. App. 82, 264 S.E.2d 597 (1980).
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they had resumed living together but denied that any act of sexual intercourse
had occurred.13 4 In affirming the judgment of the trial court for the wife, the
court of appeals relied on In re Estate ofAdamee.135 The court, though recog-
nizing that there was language inAdamee that "would indicate that the actual
intention of the parties to resume their marital cohabitation is not relevant to
determining a resumption of the marital relationship," concluded that the
above language was limited to situations in which evidence concerning re-
sumption of cohabitation was undisputed. 136 The court characterized the evi-
dence in the case before it as "conflicting" and, without mention of Murphy,
concluded that "we believe that our statement in Newton v. Williams. .. that
'[t]he issue of the parties' mutual intent is an essential element in deciding
whether the parties were reconciled and resumed cohabitation' is still the rule
where the evidence is conflicting."'
137
The logic of the Hand case is somewhat strained, and whether it can pro-
vide the means for parties to obtain partial relief from the punitive effect of
Murphy remains to be seen. However, in view of the categorical disapproval
in Murphy of both the logic and result of Newton v. Williams, it is difficult to
ascertain any hint of vitality remaining in that case. The Hand decision may
best be viewed as a valiant, if abberant, attempt to pry open the door closed by
Murphy.138
In summary, the result of North Carolina's attempts to balance its legiti-
mate interest in preserving the integrity of marriage and the parties' interest in
freedom to make their own settlements is mixed. Clearly, the older judicial
hostility to the very functions of separation agreements has largely disap-
peared. Moreover, with the repeal of the privy examination statute, the way is
at least cleared for North Carolina to develop standards to judge the substance
of the contracts. Development of the standards, particularly in the areas of
fairness and fraud, should be strongly encouraged.
On the other hand, the principle that single acts of intercourse will consti-
tute a reconciliation and therefore rescind a valid separation agreement should
be given serious reconsideration. Neither the interest of the state in preserving
marriage nor the interests of the parties in relying upon their contract is well
served by the present rule.
134. The evidence of both husband and wife showed clearly that they had in fact shared the
same house for a time after their original separation. The husband testified, however, that they
had engaged in sexual relations, whereas the wife denied any such relations and any intent to
resume the marital relationship. 46 N.C. App. at 84-85, 264 S.E.2d at 598.
135. See text accompanying notes 130-132 supra.
136. 46 N.C. App. at 86-87, 264 S.E.2d at 599. In Adamee, the supreme court did view the
case "as presenting a question of law arising upon undisputed facts.' 291 N.C. 386, 393, 230
S.E.2d 541, 546-67 (1976). It is nonetheless unclear whether that decision was intended to be
limited to factual situations susceptible to being characterized as "undisputed."
137. 46 N.C. App. at 87, 264 S.E.2d at 599. For a discussion of Newton, see text accompany-
ing notes 118-119 supra. It should be noted, however, that Newton dealt with a situation in which
there was conflicting evidence as to whether a resumption of the marital relation had occurred, but
wherein both parties admitted frequent sexual intercourse.
138. Murphy, it bears repeating, also dealt specifically with the effect of resuming sexual rela-
tions after a separation agreement. 295 N.C. 390, 394, 245 S.E.2d 693, 696 (1978).
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II. EFFECT
A. Introduction
The principles and policies that determine the initial validity of a separa-
tion agreement are quite different from those that determine the operation and
effect of an agreement. Moreover, a preliminary distinction must be drawn
between the pre-divorce and post-divorce effects of separation agreements. As
a general rule, problems encountered prior to divorce are considerably less
complex.
B. Pre-Divorce Effect
In the first instance, it is clear that a separation agreement, in effect, "le-
galizes" the separation of the parties and thus becomes a bar to divorce on the
grounds of desertion, abandonment, or nonsupport. 139 From the time the
agreement is signed, the parties' separation is presumed to have occurred by
mutual consent, and prior marital misconduct of either party will no longer be
grounds for divorce.
140
Whether a separation agreement is also a bar to alimony or alimony
pendente lite, when they are otherwise available, depends upon the agreement
itself. A true separation agreement deals primarily with the right of support,
and usually contains a "general release," as well as waivers of support, ali-
mony, and alimony pendente lite. If these provisions are included and being
complied with, the agreement will be a bar to any award of alimony, alimony
pendente lite, separate maintenance, or counsel fees.
14 1
This general rule was a source of considerable confusion and inconsis-
tency in North Carolina case law until the controversy was settled by legisla-
tion in 1967.142 G.S. 50-16.6 now provides that "Alimony, alimony pendente
lite and counsel fees may be barred by an express provision of a valid separa-
tion agreement so long as the agreement is being performed."' 143 In brief, so
long as the agreement is being performed, its provisions, although subject to
modification by the parties, are binding.14 4
139. Clark, supra note 37, at 320; 2 A. LINDEY, supra note 3, § 31. The rule in North Carolina
is the same: "Either an action for a divorce a mensa el thoro, an action for alimony without
divorce ... or a valid separation agreement may constitute a legalized separation which thereaf-
ter will permit either of the parties to obtain an absolute divorce on the ground on one year's
separation." Harrington v. Harrington, 286 N.C. 260, 264, 210 S.E.2d 190, 192 (1974).
140. Richardson v. Richardson, 257 N.C. 705, 127 S.E.2d 525 (1962); Edmisten v. Edmisten,
265 N.C. 488, 144 S.E.2d 404 (1965) (per curiam).
141. 2 A. LINDEY, supra note 3, § 36, at 36-3 to -4; Paulsen, supra note 20, at 721; and Clark,
supra note 37, at 322.
142. See 2 R. LEE, supra note 35, § 152, at 214, for a discussion of this issue.
143. In most other states, of course, this rule was originally based on the assumption that the
separation agreement had already provided for a fair and reasonable amount for support of the
dependent spouse. See Clark, supra note 37, at 322.
144. Kiger v. Kiger, 258 N.C. 126, 129, 128 S.E.2d 2 5, 237 (1962). "The provisions of a valid
separation agreement, including a consent judgment based thereon, cannot be ignored or set aside
by the court without the consent of the parties." See also Van Every v. Van Every, 265 N.C. 506,
144 S.E.2d 603 (1965).
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The effect of adultery, particularly adultery on the part of the wife, after
the execution of a separation agreement has also been the subject of some
controversy. There is no doubt, of course, that sexual intercourse prior to the
entry of a decree of final divorce with one other than one's spouse is adul-
tery.' 45 Although a separation agreement does not insulate one's conduct
from that label, it is reasonably clear that adulterous conduct will not affect
the support provisions of a separation agreement, absent a specific provision to
that effect. Although adultery might well be a statutory bar to alimony, the
support provisions of a separation agreement are contractual in nature and so
are not affected by such post-execution behavior.146 The rule with regard to
post-divorce extramarital sexual conduct is the same, again, absent a clause in
the separation agreement to the contrary.147
The "clause to the contrary"-a dum casta provision-is a rare species
indeed.' 48 In that the clause seeks to impose chastity on a spouse as a condi-
tion for support, it is an anachronism. But the rise in the number of unmar-
ried, cohabiting couples in this country has clearly led to an increase in interest
in such provisions.
149
There apparently has been no attempt to use a dum casta provision in
North Carolina. In one case a husband argued that, under a separation agree-
ment provision that obligated him to pay support to his wife for "so long as
she continues to remain single", he was relieved from the duty to make pay-
ments because she was now living with another man.150 The court of appeals
appreciated that the argument was ingenious but held that "single" plainly
meant, and was intended to mean, "unmarried" and that the husband could
not discontinue his payments.'51 Moreover, as another case makes clear, there
can be no other result with court-ordered alimony, since the entire issue is
statutory, and there is no statute that would allow a court "to modify an award
145. Therefore, such conduct may be grounds for divorce on the basis of adultery.
Wadlington, supra note 114, at 261; 2 R. LEE, supra note 35, § 196, at 497.
146. 1 A. LINDEY, supra note 3, § 15, at 15-115; Wadlington, The New Morality, supra note
114, at 149; 15 S. WILLISTON, supra note 58, § 1742, at 73.
147. 2 A. LINDEY, supra note 3, § 31, at 31-107. North Carolina is one of fewer than 10 states
where adultery constitutes an absolute bar to alimony. Freed & Foster, Divorce in the FRfty States,
supra note 2, at 306. See, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.6(a) (1976). As of 1977, thirty-two states listed
adultery as a grounds for divorce. Raphael, Frank, & Wilder, Divorce in America: The Erosion of
Fault, 81 DICK. L. REv., 719, 729 (1977).
148. Wadlington, supra note 114, at 265.
149. The full phrase is dum sola et casta vixerit ("while she lives unmarried and chaste"). It
was at one time apparently quite common in England, though its use has been extremely rare in
this country. See Wadlington, supra note 114, at 265 n.66. Wadlington goes on to suggest that
such a clause would today be open to serious constitutional challenges. Id at 271.
150. A relatively famous recent case is O'Conner Bros. Abalone Co. v. Brando, 40 Cal. App.
3rd 90, 114 Cal. Rptr. 773 (1974), in which a settlement agreement contained the standard clause
that payments should cease upon the remarriage or death of the wife. It then continued with the
clause: "For purposes of this Agreement, 'remarriage' shall include, without limitation, Plaintiff's
appearing to maintain a marital relationship with any person, or any ceremonial marriage entered
into by Plaintiff even though the same may later be annulled. ... Id at 93, 134 Ca. Rptr. at
774. For a thorough discussion of this case and of the problems with drafting and enforcing such
a clause, see Wadlington, supra note 114.




of alimony solely because of post-marital fornication."15 2 The court in that
case went on to note that the "changed circumstances" of G.S. 50-16.9(a) "has
no relevance to the post-marital conduct of either party," but rather looks only
to their financial needs.153
Finally, in Riddle v. Riddle, an ex-husband who had ceased making pay-
ments under an unadopted separation agreement raised as a defense in a suit
brought by his ex-wife the fact that his ex-wife was living with another man as
though they were husband and wife.154 The court of appeals made short shrift
of this argument: "Under the agreement, plaintiffs relations with other peo-
ple, short of marriage, do not offer defendant any defense to the enforcement
of its provisions."'
155
Nearly all separation agreements contain what is known as a non-moles-
tation clause, which consists of mutual promises that neither party will in any
way molest, disturb, malign, or interfere with the other, that each is free to
contract without the consent of the other, and that each can conduct his or her
own life without interference, as though they were unmarried. 156 The efficacy
of these clauses is unclear. Though generally they are intended to grant a kind
of permission to the establishment of sexual relations with third parties, it is
doubtful that they have this effect.' 57
In Riddle v. Riddle, the separation agreement provided that each shall "go
his or her way, and each live his or her personal life unmolested, unhampered,
and unrestricted by the other. .... -158 The husband in that case attempted to
use his wife's cohabitation with another man as a defense to his cessation of
alimony payments. 159 The court of appeals arguably relied, at least in part, on
the nonmolestation provision as a counter to the husband's defense.160 Cer-
tainly it went to the trouble to restate the clause as part of its conclusion that,
under the agreement, nothing short of marriage by the plaintiff would relieve
defendant of his duty to pay.' 61
Furthermore, it is clear that nonolestation and support covenants are
independent of one another in North Carolina. Thus, a breach of the former
does not constitute a defense to nonpayment under a separation agreement,
whether it is standing alone or embodied in a judgment or decree. In the
leading case, the defendant ex-husband stopped making support payments
152. Stallings v. Stallings, 36 N.C. App. 643, 644, 244 S.E.2d 494, 495 (1978).
153. Id at 645, 244 S.E.2d at 495.
154. 32 N.C. App. 83, 230 S.E.2d 809 (1977). See also discussion at notes 252-54, infra.
155. Id at 88, 230 S.E.2d at 812.
156. The origin of the clause goes back to ecclesiastical courts, which would grant a decree for
the restitution of conjugal rights when one spouse abandoned the other. The effect of the decree
was really to establish guilt in the abandonment. The clause, in original form, contained mutual
promises that neither party would compel or attempt to compel the other to resume cohabitation,
and was intended as a bar to the decree, which might otherwise restore conjugal relations. 2 A.
LINDEY, supra note 3, § 9, at 9-2 to -3.
157. Wadlington, supra note 114, at 260.
158. 32 N.C. App. 83, 88, 230 S.E.2d 809, 812 (1977).
159. Id at 87-88, 230 S.E.2d at 812.
160. Id at 88, 230 S.E.2d at 812.
161. Id
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shortly after he was divorced from his wife. When she sued, he alleged as a
defense that his obligation to pay had been understood by the parties to be
contingent upon his ex-wife's faithful compliance with a nonmolestation
clause.162 The plaintiff, he alleged, had "wilfully, maliciously and with evil
intent and purpose" breached this covenant by spreading gossip about him.
163
The supreme court, however, held that the covenants were independent of one
another and that defendant was not in any way relieved of his duty to pay.
164
This is also quite clearly the majority rule.165 The remedy for a breach of a
nonmolestation clause lies, if at all, in a suit for damages under the con-
tract.16
6
If the breach of the separation agreement is material, as when, for in-
stance, a supporting spouse stops making support payments as called for in the
agreement, the payee spouse generally has an election of remedies; 167 he or
she may either sue on the contract or rescind and sue for statutory or common
law support.' 68 If an election to rescind is made, arrears that accrued prior to
the date of election may still be recovered.
The problems that occur prior to the entry of a final divorce decree gener-
ally are not complex. The doctrine of election of remedies provides a powerful
corrective in the event of a material breach. It is only after the divorce decree
is entered that the major difficulties arise, because at that point the agreement
and the rights that arise under it become a kind of Cheshire cat: now you see
it, now you don't. Finding a reliable way of predicting and controlling the
ultimate relationship between the decree and the agreement is the aim of the
next section of this Article.
C Incorporation and Merger
1. Introduction
An almost impenetrable complex of problems surrounds the ultimate re-
lationship between a separation agreement and a final divorce decree. It is
162. Smith v. Smith, 225 N.C. 189, 34 S.E.2d 148 (1945).
163. Id at 191-92, 34 S.E.2d at 150. The clause read: "That they shall hereafter live separate
and apart from each other and independently of each other and each party hereto shall ... go his
or her own way, without direction, molestation or control of the other party, and that the parties
hereto further agree that they will not in any wise hereafter interfere with the other in any manner
whatsoever and will refrain from molesting one another in any manner or speaking disparagingly
of one another." Id at 190, 34 S.E.2d at 149.
164. I d at 198, 34 S.E.2d at 154.
165. Clark, supra note 37, at 165, 173; 1 A. LINDEY, supra note 3, § 9, at 61 (Supp. 1981); 2 R.
LEE, supra note 35, § 197, at 413.
166. Clark, supra note 37, at 344; and I A. LINDEY, supra note 3, § 25, at 25-3.
167. See 1 A. LINDEY, supra note 3, § 25 at 25-9 to -11, for a discussion of what constitutes a
material breach. It is at least clear that continued defaults in payments by the supporting spouse
constitute a material breach. A single default, however, if accompanied by facts indicating inten-
tion not to perform in the future may also be material. See also Stanley v. Stanley, 226 N.C. 129,37 S.E.2d H18 (1946).
168. 1 A. LINDEY, supra note 3, § 25, at 25-5; Clark, supra note 37, at 344. Most agreements
contain an election of remedies clause. Even in the absence of such a clause, however, it is reason-
ably clear that the decision to sue for statutory support is in fact an election to rescind the contract.
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rightly said that a divorce decree may ignore, approve, incorporate, or merge a
separation agreement. But since there is no agreement on what these terms
mean and no agreement on what is necessary to produce any of those results,
the statement is hardly enlightening. 169
Moreover, consequences of supreme importance turn upon the status of
the agreement after the decree: whether the court has the power to modify
support provisions in the future, the remedies that are and are not available
for enforcement in the event of breach, and the status of the agreement if its
validity is subsequently attacked. 170 There is, therefore, a compelling need to
clarify the principles that govern the relationship between agreement and de-
cree.171
Two preliminary points need to be made at the outset. First, no agree-
ment of any kind between the parties can serve to abridge or limit in any
fashion a court's inherent and statutory authority to provide for the custody
and support of children.172 Therefore, none of the discussion that follows has
any necessary application to issues of child custody, support, or visitation.173
Second, difficulties that arise in this context pertain only to support provisions
of decrees, consent judgments, or separation agreements. Property divisions
are treated quite differently. 174 A division of property may well take the form
of installment payments to a dependent spouse, and alimony may be paid in a
lump sum or by installments. Therefore, determining whether a payment is
essentially a property settlement or is a payment in lieu of support is an ex-
tremely important and often complex task.
2. Contract or Decree-The General Problem
Although the majority of states hold that courts are in no way obligated to
accept an agreement that the parties have negotiated between themselves,
courts as a practical matter generally do accept the agreement as controlling,
so long as it is fair on its face and there is no indication of fraud, duress, or
undue influence. 175 Moreover, the agreement itself may, and usually does,
purport to prescribe what its relationship with the decree will be; that is, it
states that the contract "shall survive" or be "merged and incorporated into"
169. 2 A. LINDEY, supra note 3, § 31, at 31-80 to -82. The leading case in North Carolina on
election of remedies is Wilson v. Wilson, 261 N.C. 40, 134 S.E.2d 240 (1964). It follows the major-
ity rule.
170. 2 A. LINDEY, supra note 3, § 31, at 31-88.
171. It is undoubtedly this compelling need that led the author of one piece to conclude, quite
accurately it is believed, that writers in this area have "created an illusion of greater certainty"
than actually exists, -with the result that a veritable "flood of conflicting case law" has been pro-
duced. Comment, supra note 69, at 138.
172. 1 A. LINDEY, supra note 3, § 14, at 14-32; Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 6, at 954-
55.
173. The major North Carolina case dealing with this issue is Fuchs v. Fuchs, 260 N.C. 638,
133 S.E.2d 487 (1963).
174. 2 A. LINDEY, supra note 3, & 31, at 31-69; Clark, supra note 37, at 340. See text accompa-
nying notes 264-270 for a further discussion.
175. Clark, supra note 37, at 327; C. FOOTE, R. LEvY & F. SANDER, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON FAMILY LAW 904 (1976); and 2 W. NELSON, supra note 25, § 16.08, at 401.
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the decree. These attempts at self determination may have little impact, how-
ever, because the terms used to describe the intended relationship between the
contract and the decree are often used with great imprecision or without any
real understanding of what they mean. But even when accurate language has
been used, the decree itself may be so phrased as to override the "relationship"
clause in the agreement, although leaving intact the other provisions worked
out between the parties.
The majority of commentators describe the ensuing relationship between
the agreement and the decree as one in which any one of three different results
may be produced depending both upon the language of the agreement and the
language of the decree. 176 First, contract rights may survive the decree. An
agreement, or provision thereof, that is not introduced to the court and is not
contradicted by any provision in the decree is, after divorce, just what it was
before-a private contract, and enforceable only as such. It is not subject to
future modification by the court, and is normally not subject to enforcement
by contempt.1 77 Second, the agreement may be introduced to the court for the
purpose of having the court "approve," "ratify," or "incorporate" the agree-
ment. It seems fairly clear that a decree that merely ratifies or approves the
separation agreement, without more, does not extinguish the contract rights
and liabilities of the parties. Here too the parties are basically left with only a
contract, albeit one that has received a judicial imprimature of sorts. Court
approval, however, will normally have some res judicata effect as to the fair-
ness of the agreement or the absence of fraud. 178 Finally, the agreement may
be introduced to the court for the purpose of having the contract rights extin-
guished and replaced by provisions in the court's decree. Merger is the sim-
plest way to refer to this consequence.179 Support provisions thus merged
become subject to modification by the court and enforceable by contempt. 80
A conceptually more simple approach than the above tripartite analysis is
ta describe the relationship between the agreement and the decree solely in
terms of merger consequences: either a merger results, or it does not.
181
Neither analysis, however, avoids the difficult problem of determining the ap-
176. This basic three part analysis is presented in W. WADLINGTON & M. PAULSEN, DOMES-
TIC RELATIONS, CASES AND MATERIAL 560 (1978).
177. Id See also 2 A. LINDEY, supra note 3, § 31, at 31-80.
178. W. WADLINGTON & M. PAULSEN, suipra note 176, at 560.
179. According to Williston, merger occurs when "an obligation arising under a contract is
reduced to judgment. . . [and] the original obligation is by operation of law extinguished and
merged in the new obligation." 15 S. WILLISTON, supra note 58, § 1874A, at 637 (3d ed. Jaeger
1972). It has been pointed out that it is technically not a proper application of the classic merger
doctrine, since the support obligation is based, not on a contract obligation, but on the duty of
support. Note, Control of Post-Divorce Level of Support by Prior Agreement, 63 HARV. L. REv.
337, 339 (1949). Moreover, the term is often used with great imprecision.
180. Wadlington, supra note 114, at 272-73.
181. 2 A. LINDEY, supra note 3, § 31, at 31-87. It should be noted again that it is only the
obligation to pay money that is merged. The general rule is that when the obligation is a promise
to pay money, a decree or judgment ordering the payment of money merges the obligation in the
decree or judgment; thus an independent action cannot be brought later on the obligation. If the
obligation or decree requires something other than the payment of money, however, the obligation
is not merged in the decree. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 450(1)(f), Comment at 537.
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propriate category into which an agreement will fall. In any case, the real
interest of the parties lies not in defining what may occur after the fact, but
rather in determining how to create the particular result they desire.
Unfortunately, what remains somewhat unclear under any of these ap-
proachs is precisely what is necessary to accomplish, or in some instances, to
avoid, a merger. No small part of the confusion is caused by the often indis-
criminate use of the term "incorporation" by courts, counsel, and commenta-
tors. The term is sometimes used as a synonym for merger, and sometimes as
a description of the "approval" result.' 8 2 Consistent uses of the terms "incor-
poration" and "merger" would go far in clearing up some of the confusion
that has surrounded this area.
Various factors aid in determining whether a merger has occurred or not.
Clark lists three major considerations: "(a) the intent of the parties as shown
by the agreement; (b) the extent to which, and the method by which the agree-
ment is set forth in the decree; and (c) whether the decree specifically orders
performance of the agreement."' 83 On the other hand, it seems that the wide-
spread confusion in this area has led courts to adopt what might be called a
more technical approach: that notwithstanding statements about the impor-
tance of the intent of the parties as shown in their agreement, it is the language
used in the decree and the manner in which the agreement is set forth therein
that appears to be most determinative. 184 If, for example, a court specifically
orders certain provisions of the agreement to be performed by the parties,
those provisions will in all probability be held to be merged in the decree, even
if there is a specific provision in the agreement against merger.18 5 If, on the
other hand, a decree simply incorporates the agreement by reference, without
specifically setting forth the provisions and ordering that they be performed, a
finding of no merger is probable even if the agreement had provided for
merger in the decree.'8 6 In the increasingly rare instances in which a decree
orders an alimony payment in an amount less than that called for in the agree-
ment, there are mixed results. Some courts hold that a merger has occurred,
regardless of the intent of the parties as expressed in the agreement. Others
hold that the contract rights for the difference between the amount granted in
the decree and the amount provided for in the agreement do survive. 187
3. Consequences of Merger
Generally the issue of whether contract rights have survived or have been
182. Several commentators conclude that "incorporation" works a merger. I W. NELSON,
supra note 25, § 13.51, at 535; Clark, supra note 37, at 331; and Comment, supra note 69, at 146.
C. FOOTE, R. LEVY & F. SANDER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW 915 (1976) conclude:
"If the agreement was expressly incorporated in the decree, it is generally deemed merged in it,
and hence loses its separate vitality." Lindey, on the other hand, says that only in a minority of
states does incorporation work a merger. 2 A. LINDEY, supra note 3, § 31, at 31-84.
183. Clark, supra note 37, at 333.
184. Certainly this has been the case in North Carolina. See discussion at notes 222-23 in/ra.
185. 2 A. LINDEY, supra note 3, § 31, at 31-85; Comment, supra note 69, at 152.
186. Comment, supra note 69, at 146. There is, of course, authority to the contrary.
187. For a discussion of the cases, see Note, supra note 179, at 338.
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merged in the decree arises in one of two contexts-a party seeks either modi-
fication of the support provisions of the decree or enforcement of those provi-
sions through contempt. 188 By most estimates, the modification issue is the
most troublesome and probably the most confusing. 189 The general rule is
that support provisions that have been merged (or unfortunately, in the lan-
guage of many courts, "incorporated") into the decree may be modified by a
court at a later time, provided the usual statutory requirement of a showing of
changed conditions is met.190
The major theory on which modification is allowed is that through
merger the duty to pay is no longer contractual in nature but has become an
order of the court. 191 Under this theory a court merely modifies its own de-
cree. It does not purport to amend the contract between the parties, and in-
deed it would be without power to do so. 192 This in turn leads again to the
issue of contract survival: if the court has only modified its own support de-
cree, do the contract rights survive? Clearly the merger theory itself is suffi-
cient to deal with this issue in the majority of cases, since merger generally
works a total extinguishment of contract rights. However, when a jurisdiction
bases its power to modify on a different theory, contract rights may survive.
193
Contract rights also survive when a court modifies a support agreement but
expressly states that the modification is without prejudice to the rights of the
parties under the contract. Neither result is common, however.' 94 Although
many interesting contract theories have been advanced to urge courts to mod-
ify unmerged provisions, judicial reluctance to deviate from the principle that
only the parties may modify their own contract has prevailed thus far.
195
Finally, it should be noted that there can be no modification of the sup-
port provisions of what is called an "integrated" settlement. The term
188. As noted previously, the distinction is also important when there are subsequent attacks
on the validity of the agreement or decree. If the agreement is merged into the decree, subsequent
collateral attack on it will not be permitted, since the court is deemed to have passed on its validity
via merger. The issue thus becomes res judicata. 2 A. LINDEY, supra, note 3, § 31, at 31-93. Mere
approval of the contract, without merger, may also have this effect.
189. See generally Note, ModpFcation of Spousal Support: A Survey of a Confusing Area of the
Law, 17 J. FAM. L. 711 (1978-79).
190. The power of a court to modify a support decree is normally statutory. Forty-sixjurisdic-
tions apparently do provide for this power to modify. Note, supra note 189, at 719 n.33. In two
others there is no statutory provision for modification, but courts nonetheless allow it on the the-
ory that alimony is not a "final judgment." Id. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.9(a) provides that: "An
order of a court of this State for alimony or alimony pendente lite, whether contested or entered
by consent, may be modified or vacated at any time, upon motion in the cause and a showing of
changed circumstances by either party or anyone interested." The statute is fairly typical, except
for the "or anyone interested" provision.
A decree awarding support is res judicata only as to conditions or circumstances existing at
the time of the decree. Note, supra note 189, at 722. This Article will not attempt to deal with
what conditions and changes constitute an appropriate showing of changed circumstances.
191. There are at least three other theories also used to support a court's power to modify
support provisions. For a discussion of these, see Note, supra note 189, at 723; Annot., 61
A.L.R.3d 520, 534 (1975).
192. 2 A. LINDEY, supra note 3, § 31, at 31-62.
193. Clark, supra note 37, at 336; and note 191 supra.
194. Id at 338. It is generally thought that such a result would be unfair to the payor.
195. See Comment, supra note 69, at 155-57.
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originated with California courts but is now generally used to refer to any
agreement in which the support and property division provisions are so struc-
tured as to constitute reciprocal consideration for each other. 196 Because mod-
ification of the one would result in a modification of the other, and because
courts are without power to modify property settlements, the support provi-
sions of the agreement become immune to judicial change. Stated differently,
unless the payments to the dependent spouse are made in consideration for the
release of support rights, and not in consideration for the transfer of property
or for the release of property rights, they will not be susceptible to modifica-
tion.
What determines whether a combined property settlement/separation
agreement is an "integrated" document is difficult to state in general terms.
The first cases apparently based their conclusions on a specific recital in the
agreement that the promises were made as reciprocal consideration for one
another.197 Later cases have taken a considerably more flexible approach.
Lindey suggests that no single factor should be controlling in determining sep-
arability, but that the agreement should be considered as a whole, including
the language of the parties, the purpose of the agreement, the circumstances
under which it was made, and the nature and value of the property in-
volved. 198
Whether contempt powers are available to enforce support provisions of
an agreement or decree is the other major issue that arises. It is generally held
that alimony is not a debt in the normal sense, so that enforcement of alimony
through contempt does not violate state and federal prohibitions against im-
prisonment for debt. 199 Alimony is usually defined as a court-ordered provi-
sion for the support of a dependent spouse. Therefore, a support provision of
a separation agreement that has been fully merged in a divorce decree is en-
forceable by contempt in the great majority of jurisdictions.2°°
The general rule is that nonmerged provisions of a separation agreement
or property settlement may not be enforced by contempt. Specific perform-
ance to enforce nonmerged support provisions, however, has long been avail-
able as a remedy in some states, and has recently become available in North
Carolina. 20' Contract remedies for the enforcement of support provisions of
nonmerged separation agreement are notoriously ineffective.202 At a mini-
mum they involve a multiplicity of suits and difficulties with execution. In
addition, because the underlying obligation to support is the same whether it
196. 2 A. LINDEY, supra note 3, § 31, at 31-72.
197. Clark, supra note 37, at 339.
198. 2 A. LINDEY, supra note 3, § 31, at 31-73. It may be noted that a reduced alimony
amount coupled with a generous property settlement is a strong indication that the provisions
were made as consideration for each other.
199. 2 W. NELsON, supra note 25, § 16.03, at 389.
200. Id at 3 87-88; and Clark, supra note 37, at 332. Alimony is not a money judgment, but is
rather "a command to pay and perform a moral and social obligation." 2 W. NELSON, supra note
25, § 16.03, at 390.
201. See discussion accompanying text at notes 241-245 infra.
202. Clark, supra note 37, at 183.
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arises out of contract or decree, courts have become increasingly inclined to
depart from the inflexibility of the spirit, if not of the letter of the general rule
in this area, and grant specific performance of a separation agreement. Once a
decree ordering a supporting spouse specifically to perform the terms of a con-
tract is violated, the contempt power is available, albeit through a sort of back
door approach.203 The provisions of a property settlement that call for the
transfer of interests in land may be enforced through specific performance like
any other contract.
2°4
D. Integration/Merger Problems in North Carolina
1. Introduction
North Carolina has had no less difficulty than most states in developing a
reliable and predictable method for parties to control the ultimate relationship
between a separation agreement and a divorce decree. This is undoubtedly
due in part to a certain judicial resistance, particularly evident when the rele-
vant principles in this area were first formulated, to the idea of private control
of the incidents of divorce. It is also caused by the difficulties of reconciling
two seemingly inconsistent interests: the interest in preserving traditional rules
of contract, even when the contract focused on support, and the interests of the
state in controlling or enforcing support duties. Here too the consequences of
merger, or "incorporation" or "adoption," (North Carolina courts tend to use
the latter two terms to refer to merger results) are relatively clear, but the
methods and reasoning by which the results are accomplished have not always
been either clear or consistent.
Before proceeding further several peculiarities of North Carolina statu-
tory history should be explained. Prior to 1967 alimony could not be awarded
as an incident to an absolute divorce.205 Permanent alimony, however, could
be awarded incident to a divorce from bed and board or to an action for ali-
mony without divorce, so long as statutory grounds were present. This posi-
tion reflected an interesting fidelity to the original concept of alimony as a
replacement for the husband's duty of support.20 6 Of course, that duty did not
survive an absolute divorce. In any case, it was not until 1967 that alimony
could be ordered in a decree of absolute divorce, be it pursuant to a separation
agreement or otherwise.20 7 To circumvent this rather quaint rule, parties
made extensive use of consent judgments to embody their private agreements
on support. The consent judgment had a life independent of any decree of
divorce. As long as it was entered "before the commencement of the proceed-
ing for absolute divorce,"208 an alimony or support agreement between the
203. Id
204. Id
205. 2 R. LEE, supra note 35, § 191, at 486 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
206. See text accompanying note 25 supra.
207. 2 R. LEE, supra note 35, § 191, at 486 (1979). N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.8 (b)(1) now reads
that payment of alimony may be ordered in an action for divorce "either absolute or from bed and
board.'
208. 2 R. LEE, supra note 35, § 191, at 401 n.81. See also Merritt v. Merritt, 237 N.C. 271, 74
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parties, entered as a consent judgment, would survive a decree of absolute
divorce. Now, of course, the separation agreement itself may be embodied,
adopted, approved, or merged in a divorce decree without being first embod-
ied in a consent judgment. The rules are the same in either case.
The result is that cases before 1967 that deal with the merger/
incorporation problem are speaking either to consent judgments or to separa-
tion agreements incident to actions for divorce from bed and board or for
alimony without divorce. Consent judgments are still more frequently used in
North Carolina than in most other states largely because of this unusual his-
torical development. It bears repeating, however, that a consent judgment is
basically little more than a separation agreement embodied in a decree.
209
The ultimate effect was that consent judgments substituted for divorce decrees
insofar as the consequences of the relationship between the decree and the
private agreement were concerned, so that the language of consent judgments
became the decisive factor in determining what contract rights survived or
were extinguished by the judgment.
The following sections examine North Carolina's attempt to resolve the
major merger issues. The terminology used by the courts in discussing this
problem is important to note. They have made virtually no use of the term
"merger," and prior to 1964 there was very little use of the term "incorpora-
tion." Rather the distinction appeared to be that between "mere approval"
and "adoption. '210 Although the supreme court apparently tried mightily to
lay down a simple and coherent "either-it-is-or-it-isn't" rule for incorpora-
tion/merger, its best efforts fell upon many deaf ears, and, perhaps as a result,
the court itself has begun to retrench on its original position.
2. "Adoption" of Decrees in North Carolina
Bunn v. Bunn, decided in 1961, is still the leading case on the issue of
merger.211 The issue in Bunn was whether a consent judgment which "or-
dered, adjudged and decreed" an alimony payment could be modified. In a
lengthy opinion, Chief Justice Sharp painstakingly distinguished two types of
consent judgments in North Carolina. In the first variety, the "court merely
approves or sanctions the payments which the husband has agreed to make for
S.E.2d 529 (1953); and Stanley v. Stanley, 226 N.C. 129, 37 S.E.2d 118 (1946). The quoted lan-
guage is from the pre-1955 amendment of G.S. 50-11. In 1955 the language was changed to read
that "a decree of absolute divorce shall not impair or destroy the right of a spouse to receive
alimony. ..provided for such spouse under any judgment or decree of a court rendered before or
at the time of the rendering of the judgment for absolute divorce." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-11(c)
(1976) (emphasis added.)
209. See Bunn v. Bunn, 262 N.C. 67, 136 S.E.2d 240 (1964).
210. A consistent use of these terms would, of course, greatly simplify the issues here. Unfor-
tunately courts have begun to make considerable use of the term "incorporation" to mean adop-
tion or merger, with confusing results. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Mitchell, 270 N.C. 253, 256, 154
S.E.2d 71, 73 (1967); Williford v. Williford, 10 N.C. App. 451, 179 S.E.2d 114 (1971); Riddle v.
Riddle, 32 N.C. App. 83, 85, 230 S.E.2d 809, 811 (1977); and Baugh v. Baugh, 44 N.C. App. 50: 51,
260 S.E.2d 161, 162 (1979). Much of this undoubtedly stems from the results in Levitch v. Levitch,
294 N.C. 437, 241 S.E.2d 506 (1978), discussed in text accompanying notes 224-234 infra.
211. 262 N.C. 67, 69, 136 S.E.2d 240, 242 (1964).
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the wife's support and sets them out in a judgment against him. Such a judg-
ment constitutes nothing more than a contract between the parties made with
the approval of the court."212 Further, since "the court itself does not in such
case order the payments, the amount specified therein is not technically ali-
mony."213 Such a contract-judgment, in the court's opinion,
[was] enforceable only as an ordinary contract. It may not be en-
forced by contempt proceedings and, insofar as it fixes the amount of
support for the wife, it cannot be changed or set aside except with the
consent of both parties in the absence of a finding that the agreement
was unfair to the wife or that her consent was obtained by fraud or
mutual mistake.
214
In the second type of consent judgment, on the other hand, the court
"adopts the agreement of the parties as its own determination of their respec-
tive rights and obligations and orders the husband to pay the specified
amounts as alimony." 215 Moreover, the court continued:
A judgment of the second type, being an order of the court, may be
modified by the court at any time changed conditions make a modifi-
cation right and proper. The fact that the parties have agreed and
consented to the amount of the alimony decreed by the court does
not take away its power to modify the award or to enforce it by at-
tachment for contempt should the husband wilfully fail to pay it.
216
When the issue is whether the consent judgment may be modified or en-
forced by the contempt power of the court, "the question for the court in each
case is whether the provision for the wife contained therein rests only upon
contract or is an adjudication of the court. If it rests on both, it is no less a
decree of the court." Then, restating in the interests of clarity, the court went
on to note that any judgment that awards true alimony,217 "notwithstanding it
was entered by the consent of the parties, is enforceable by contempt proceed-
ings, . .."218 Finally, the court noted, "if the judgment can be enforced by
contempt, it may be modified and vice versa." 219
The Bunn decision marked no change in North Carolina law in this





216. Id at 69, 136 S.E.2d at 243.
217. Alimony, in its technical sense, has been defined as "an allowance made for the support
of the wife out of the estate of the husband by order of court in an appropriate proceeding.
Stanley v. Stanley, 226 N.C. 129, 133, 37 S.E.2d 118, 120 (1946) (emphasis added).
218. Bunn v. Bunn, 262 N.C. 67, 70, 136 S.E.2d 240, 243 (1964), But see text accompanying
notes at 250-51 infra. In view of Moore v. Moore, 297 N.C. 14, 252 S.E.2d 735 (1979), the state-
ment needs some explanation. It is still, however, literally correct.
219. But see text accompanying notes 250-51 infra. In view of Moore v. Moore, 297 N.C. 14,
252 S.E.2d 735 (1979), the statement needs some explanation. It is still, however, literally correct.
220. For example, in Stanley v. Stanley, 226 N.C. 129, 37 S.E.2d 118 (1946) the wife's attempt
to enforce by contempt a consent judgment, which had not specifically ordered her husband to
pay her support money, was refused. In the absence of such an order, the court said, this was "an
extrajudicial transaction, and although ... relating to the support of the wife, had no more sanc-
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isting status of the law. Its basic point is that while parties are largely free to
exclude the state from their private settlements, they are thereafter to be remit-
ted solely to the rights and duties undertaken in their contracts. Only if the
court were an active third party in determining distributive consequences
would the power of the state be available to enforce provisions by contempt or
to modify them.
221
There are, however, problems with the "either/or" result reached by
Bunn. First, the distinction the court draws largely ignores that even an order
by a court that parties perform certain duties is often little more than a rubber
stamp of a private agreement. In the great majority of cases that result in
"adopted" agreements, a court has formally, but not substantively, taken an
active role in determining support consequences. Second, this analysis fails to
recognize that support duties, whether embodied in a decree or agreement,
have the same origin in law. That the duty be fulfiled is of no less compelling
interest to the state in either case.
222
Moreover, the conclusion was apparently drawn from these cases, and
particularly from Bunn itself, that a support provision in a separation agree-
ment could not be considered to have been adopted by the court unless the
decree or judgment spec'ficall, "ordered, adjudged and decreed" that the sup-
porting spouse make the payments.223 Clearly this was a reliable, if overly
rigid, approach to the problem, and undoubtedly it remains true today that a
tion for its enforcement than any other civil contract." Id at 133, 37 S.E.2d at 120. In Stancil v.
Stancil the court had stated that ".. . although a judgment may be entered by consent, based on a
written agreement, if such judgment orders and decrees that the husband shall pay certain sums as
alimony for the support of his wife. . ." contempt powers shall be available for enforcement. 255
N.C. 507, 509, 121 S.E.2d 882, 884 (1961). And in Holden v. Holden, an extreme example of
insistence upon precise language, the supreme court held that a consent judgment, which had
ordered, adjudged and decreed "that the parties have agreed that husband will pay," could not be
enforced by contempt, since the decree did not specifically order the payments to be made. 245
N.C. 1, 6, 95 S.E.2d 118, 124 (1956).
221. Clearly the availability of the courts power here is a double-edged sword. Whatever
sense of security a party may have in knowing contempt remedies are possible must be balanced
against the lack of certainty that modification possibilities create.
222. The growing tendency to allow specific performance as a remedy for nonmerged support
provisions is an implicit recognition of the state's interest in having all support obligations per-
formed. Specific performance in this context also obviates the problem discussed in the preceed-
ing note. A party may in fact be protected against modification and still have the threat of
contempt as a remedy.
223. See, e.g., Sayland v. Sayland, 267 N.C. 378, 148 S.E.2d 218 (1966); Elmore v. Elmore, 4
N.C. App. 192, 166 S.E.2d 506 (1969); Seaborn v. Seabom, 32 N.C. App. 556, 233 S.E.2d 67
(1977). In each instance the fact that the court below had "ordered, adjudged and decreed" the
provision for support was conclusive. On the other hand, in Shankle v. Shankle, 26 N.C. App.
565, 216 S.E.2d 915 (1975), a Nevada decree had "ratified, approved and confirmed" a separation
agreement and ordered the parties to do "each and every act" required by it; but the court here,
C. g its own law, held it had no power to modify the decree. And in Williford v.
lliford 10 .C. App. 451, 179 S.E.2d 114 (1971), alimony was ordered "incorporated" into the
decree, which then recited the provision verbatim. The court held, however, that the lower court
"did not adopt the agreement of the parties as its own determination, but merely approved or
sanctioned the payments... !' I at 454, 179 S.E.2d at 116. In an apparent excess of caution,
one consent judgment "ordered, adjudged and decreed" alimony, then went on to state: "'This
Order is more than a simple Consent Order and upon proper cause shown, the Court shall subject
the parties to such penalties as may be required by the Court in case of contempt."' Whitesides v.
Whitesides, 271 N.C. 560, 561, 157 S.E.2d 82, 83 (1967).
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decree of the court, which specifically orders the supporting spouse to make
payments to the dependent spouse, will result in an "adoption. 224 A 1978
case, however, makes it clear that this is not the only means by which an adop-
tion of the agreement may occur.
In Levitch v. Levitch, a 1973 divorce decree ordered, adjudged and de-
creed "that the Separation Agreement heretofore entered into by the parties
...be. . .incorporated by reference in this Judgment and shall survive this
Judgment." 22 In a decision whose result, if not logical, is laudable, the
supreme court held that "the incorporation language here. . . appears suffi-
ciently compelling to indicate an intent on the part of the court to order pay-
ment of the alimony," and that the decree should therefore be enforceable
through contempt.2 26 In so holding the court relied on language of an earlier
case, Mitchell v. Mitchell, that when the agreement "with reference to the
wife's support is incorporated in the judgment, [the parties']. . . contract is
superceded by the court's decree. The obligations imposed are those of the
judgment, which is enforceable as such." z2 2 7 Mitchell, however, did not in-
volve a merger issue. Rather, it dealt with a consent judgment that had or-
dered, adjudged and decreed that "[p]laintiff shall pay to the defendant the
sum . . ",228 with no mention of the term "alimony." In that case, the
supreme court, although noting that the judgment was not worded with proper
care, held that it was nonetheless an order to pay alimony and therefore en-
forceable by contempt. In other words, Mitchell did not involve the kind of
"incorporating language found in Levitch, but rather dealt with the issue of
whether there was an order to pay alimony.
229
Further, the defendant in Levitch argued that because the separation
agreement itself provided that it was to be "incorporated in any decree of ab-
solute divorce. . . without merging therein," the agreement should be inter-
preted as having been approved, not adopted. In response, the court looked
not merely to the language used in the decree, but to the intent of the render-
ing court.230 The court then concluded that the lower court had incorporated
the agreement on its own, without reference to the "incorporated but not
merged" provision of the separation agreement.
231
While it is somewhat difficult to assess Levitch, the case is clearly of great
significance. In a marked change from prior case law, it holds that a decree
224. Warnings to counsel to word their judgments with care were frequent occurrences after
Bunn. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Mitchell, 270 N.C. 253, 258, 154 S.E.2d 71, 75 (1967); Williford v.
Williford, 10 N.C. App. 529, 531, 179 S.E.2d 113, 114 (1971), cert. denied, 278 N.C. 301, 180
S.E.2d 177 (1971). The threshold requirements for use of contempt power in Bunn, it might be
noted, are substantially identical to those suggested by Clark, supra note 37, at 333.
225. 294 N.C. 437, 439, 241 S.E.2d 506, 507 (1978).
226. Id
227. Id at 438-39, 241 S.E.2d at 507 (quoting Mitchell v. Mitchell, 270 N.C. 253, 256, 154
S.E.2d 71, 73 (1967)).
228. Mitchell v. Mitchell, 270 N.C. 253, 254, 154 S.E.2d 71, 72 (1967).
229. Id at 256, 154 S.E.2d at 74.
230. Levitch v. Levitch, 294 N.C. 437, 439, 241 S.E.2d 506, 507 (1978).
231. Id
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incorporating by reference the provisions of a separation agreement can work
an "adoption" of the support provisions, despite the absence of an actual order
that the support payments be made.232 This change is wholly appropriate and
probably more accurately reflects the intent of a court that "incorporates" the
provisions of a separation agreement.233 As noted previously, the earlier insis-
tence that a decree specifically order, adjudge and decree that certain pay-
ments be made was an overly technical and formalistic solution to a very
complex issue.
Unfortunately, Levitch was an inappropriate vehicle by which to intro-
duce this change to North Carolina law. Adoption through incorporation
should not be accomplished in opposition to the express intent of the parties.
More importantly, the case has been interpreted to draw a distinction between
a consent judgment and a separation agreement that probably should not be
drawn.234 Regrettably, the extremely brief opinion is susceptible to this misin-
terpretation.235 It would be unrealistic, however, to conclude that any distinc-
tion has been drawn between separation agreements and consent judgments
insofar as either may be adopted through incorporation. The more logical
conclusion, and the one consistent with prior law, is that a court may, if it so
intends, adopt either kind of agreement by incorporation within its decree.
3. Enforcement
The traditional rule is that a support obligation resting only in contract
may not be enforced by contempt. As the supreme court explained in Bunn v.
Bunn,236 if a court does not specifically order the payments, "alimony" in a
technical sense does not exist, and thus the nonmerged agreement is "enforce-
able only as an ordinary contract. ' 237 The rule was stated more fully by the
232. Note, also, that the separation agreement expressed a contrary intent.
233. In this case, however, it is not quite clear why the supreme court thought the lower court
had intended to merge the agreement into the decree. The 'higher court simply concluded that
"the court found that the agreement '. . . shall survive this action and should be incorporated by
reference herein...' and specifically ordered that it be incorporated by reference with no mention
of any reason for the incorporation other than its determination that the agreement would survive
the judgment. In the face of such unequivocal language, we cannot hold that a mere proviso in
the agreement should overcome the express intent of the court to adopt the alimony provisions
into its order." Id at 440, 241 S.E.2d at 508.
234. For instance, the court states that "[a]Ithough the intent of the parties is controlling in the
interpretation of consent judgments,. . . the decree in the instant case does not appear to have
been obtained by consent." Levitch v. Levitch, 294 N.C. 437, 439, 241 S.E.2d 506, 507-08 (1978).
The apparent distinction is lacking in meaning, however, since the court's decree could just as
easily have incorporated a consent judgment. See Bunn v. Bunn, 262 N.C. 67, 136 S.E.2d 240
(1964).
For the proposition quoted above the court cited to Yount v. Lowe, 288 N.C. 90, 215 S.E.2d
563 (1975), which simply restates the general proposition that consent judgments, being nothing
more than contracts between private parties, are to be interpreted according to standard rules of
construction, including ascertainment of the intent of the parties.
235. See Survey of Developments in North Carolina Law, 1978--Family Law, 57 N.C.L. REV.
827, 1093 (1979).
236. 262 N.C. 67, 136 S.E.2d 240 (1964).
237. Id at 69, 136 S.E.2d at 242. Seealso Stanley v. Stanley, 226 N.C. 129, 133,37 S.E.2d 118,
121 (1946), in which the court explained that a contrary result would violate the constitutional
prohibition against imprisonment for debt.
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court of appeals in a case in which enforcement was sought of a New York
decree ordering specific performance under a separation agreement. The court
of appeals held that the New York judgment, though entitled to recognition
here, was not entitled to specific performance:
238
The enforcement of support payments provided in an extra-judicial
separation agreement is accomplished as in the case of any other civil
contract, i.e., through an action for breach of the contract seeking a
judgment for sums due. Such an action, sounding in contract, is not
enforceable by execution inpersonam in the form of imprisonment
for civil contempt for noncompliance, by reason of the constitutional
prohibition against imprisonment for debt.
239
One year later, Moore v. Moore presented the supreme court with the
same issue: "whether an action for specific performance will lie to enforce
alimony provisions of a separation agreement, which has not been made part
of a divorce decree." 24° In a decision at le ast as surprising as that in Levitch,
the supreme court held that the plaintiff wife was entitled to a decree of spe-
cific performance.
241
The court first distinguished the Bunn line of cases on the ground that
plaintiff here had only sought a decree of specific performance ordering de-
fendant to comply with the alimony provisions of the separation agreement,
and did not seek direct enforcement of the agreement through the use of the
contempt power. Then it repeated the standard that a separation agreement is
"generally subject to the same rules of law with respect to its enforcement as
any other contract," including specific performance when there is no adequate
remedy at law.242 An adequate remedy, moreover, "'is not a partial remedy.
It is a full and complete remedy, . . . It is not enough that there is some
remedy at law; it must be as practical and as efficient to the ends ofjustice and
its prompt administration as the remedy in equity.' "243 Noting further that
the adequacy of the legal remedy must be evaluated in a relative way, that is,
relative to the type of contract and the relations of the parties, the court con-
cluded that plaintiffs legal remedy here involved a multiplicity of suits and
"unusual and extreme hardship."'244 Added to this was the egregious fact that
there was "a deliberate pattern of conduct by defendant to defeat plaintiffs
rights under their separation agreement.
'245
238. Sainz v. Sainz, 36 N.C. App. 744, 245 S.E.2d 372 (1978).
239. Id at 747, 245 S.E.2d at 374.
240. Moore v. Moore, 297 N.C. 14, 252 S.E.2d 735, 736 (1979).
241. Id at 18, 252 S.E.2d at 739.
242. Id at 16, 252 S.E.2d at 737.
243. Id at 16,252 S.E.2d at 738, (quoting Sumner v. Staton, 151 N.C. 198, 201, 65 S.E.2d 902,
904 (1909)).
244. Moore v. Moore, 297 N.C. 14, 17-18, 252 S.E.2d 735, 738 (1979).
245. Id at 18, 252 S:E.2d at 738-39. The defendant husband, whose alimony payments were
$250.00 per month, made $20,000.00 annually. As a matter of course, he immediately endorsed
his paychecks over to his second wife who deposited them in her own account. His house was
owned jointly with his second wife, and all other property, including cars and boat trailer, were in
the second wife's name. His affairs were, in other words, structured so that plaintiff had been
unable either to garnish his wages or execute successfully against his property. Her judgment for
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The case is one of great importance. However, while it marks a signifi-
cant and sensible change in North Carolina law, caution is in order. Clearly
Moore does not stand for the proposition that specific performance will al-
ways be available to enforce separation agreements not adopted by a decree.
The result in the case would probably have been different had the defendant
not deliberately violated the provisions of the separation agreement. But,
grounded as it is in standard contract principles, the case obviously does stand
for the proposition that upon a proper showing of inadequacy of remedies at
law, a separation agreement may be enforced by a decree of specific perform-
ance. North Carolina has thus joined a growing number of states that have
reached this rather liberal, but wholly sensible, result.246 Since the support
provisions of a separation agreement speak directly to the all important duty
of support, the result should not be otherwise.
24 7
Several additional observations about Moore are warranted. First, its re-
sult does not run afoul of the prohibition against imprisonment for debt.
248
By taking one step back from the direct application of the contempt power,
that difficulty is at least arguably obviated. Furthermore, by basing its conclu-
sion solely on the ground that plaintiff's remedy at law was inadequate, the
court neatly avoided any suggestion that its order-that defendant specifically
perform the separation agreement-was a direct order to pay alimony. Any
other result would have been impossible, since G.S. 50-16 allows an award of
alimony only in an action for alimony without divorce, absolute divorce, or
divorce from bed and board.249 More importantly, the court also avoided any
suggestion that it might have the power to modify the support provisions of
the agreement in the future.
In Bunn v. Bunn, it should be recalled, the supreme court said "[ijf the
judgment can be enforced by contempt, it may be modified and vice versa.
''250
There is no reason to conclude that Moore has changed this long-standing
rule-that the defendant there could move for a modification in the amount of
alimony he had obligated himself to pay under the separation agreement. As
noted previously, however, this would be an extremely unlikely result. A
Moore-type defendant would be held in contempt not for his failure to live up
nearly $5,000.00 in arrears was, as is not uncommon, virtually worthless. Id at 14-15, 252 S.E.2d
at 736-37.
246. See, e.g., Strasner v. Strasner, 232 Ark. 478, 338 S.W.2d 679 (1960); Burke v. Burke, 32
Del. Ch. 320, 86 A.2d 51 (1952); Hagen v. Viney, 124 Fla. 747, 169 So. 391 (1936); Lorant v.
Lorant, 366 Mass. 380, 318 N.E.2d 830 (1974); Zouck v. Zouck, 204 Mo. 285, 104 A.2d 573 (1954).
247. Although the context was quite different, Mitchell v. Mitchell, 270 N.C. 253, 154 S.E.2d
71 (1967) provides a more than adequate rationale for the result in Moore. In Mitchell it was said
that: "The court would demean itself if it entered a decree providing that the husband support
and maintain the wife upon terms which he himself had suggested (and to which he gave his
written consent), then allowed him to get an absolute divorce upon the strength of that decree,
and-upon his wilful failure to comply with its terms-announced that it was powerless to enforce
its judgment by contempt proceedings." Id at 258, 154 S.E.2d at 74-75.
248. The decision itself does not even mention this as a consideration, despite the fact that it
formed the basis for the court of appeals' decision. See Moore v. Moore, 38 N.C. App. 700, 248
S.E.2d 761 (1978).
249. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.1 (1976).
250. Bunn v. Bunn, 262 N.C. 67, 70, 136 S.E.2d 240, 243 (1964).
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to the terms of the support provisions of a separation agreement, but rather for
his failure to obey a court's order that he do so. The difference is not merely
one of semantics: the result in Moore does not transform a support provision
in a separation agreement into an order for technical alimony.25 1 There is,
therefore, no reason to conclude that Moore has in any way affected the stan-
dards for modification of alimony. It has, however, made "mere approval" of
separation agreements or consent judgments a much more attractive option.
Finally, one last question merits attention: Does Moore also mean that
injunctive relief, enjoining a defendant from breaching the terms of an
"unadopted" separation agreement, is available? In Riddle v. Riddle, a 1977
case, the court of appeals denied just such a motion for injunctive relief on the
ground that, since plaintiffs obvious purpose in seeking such was "to be able
to enforce the support provisions of the separation agreement by contempt
proceedings," plaintiff had an adequate remedy at law.252 In addition, the
court implied that allowing injunctive relief would violate constitutional
prohibitions against imprisonment for debt. 253 Presumably, if a plaintiff could
meet the standards for injunctive relief, however, which are very similar to
those for specific performance, there should no longer be any reason why that
relief should not be available.
2 54
4. Support and Property Settlements
The issue of enforceability does lead to the difficulties encountered in dis-
tinguishing a support settlement agreement from a property settlement, since
that problem usually arises when one party seeks to modify a money payment
called for under an agreement. A brief review of modification principles is,
therefore, in order.
It is firmly established, of course, that a spousal support agreement,
whether entered by consent or by decree, which is not adopted by the court, or
"incorporated" a la Levitch, is neither enforceable by contempt nor subject to
251. See note 237 supra.
252. 32 N.C. App. 83, 87, 230 S.E.2d 809, 812 (1977).
253. Id The constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt is not directly men-
tioned in Riddle. The court did rely on Stanley for its holding, however, and Stanleyr result is
based directly on that prohibition. See supra, note 220. Moreover, in Sainz v. Sainz, the court of
appeals discussed the prohibition against imprisonment for debt and stated that, based on such
reasoning, it had recently denied injunctive relief in Riddle. Sainz v. Sainz, 36 N.C. App. 744,747,
245 S.E.2d 372, 376 (1978).
254. N.C. GEN. STAT. § lA-I, Rule 65(b) (1969) states that a temporary restraining order,
which is the functional equivalent of a preliminary injunction, Lambe v. Smith, 11 N.C. App. 580,
181 S.E.2d 783 (1971), may be granted "if it clearly appears. . . that immediate and irreparable
injury, loss, or damage will result to the applicant. . .
In an interesting older case, Boone v. Boone, 217 N.C. 722, 9 S.E.2d 383 (1940), the supreme
court held that plaintiff wife was entitled to both injunctive relief and specific performance to
prevent her husband from violating an oral provision of their separation agreement. He had
promised not to sue for divorce on the grounds of adultery and not to institute an action for
alienation of affections against a third party (who joined in the suit with wife here as plaintifi).
The supreme court found that specific performance was necessary in order to prevent irreparable
harm and that the plaintiffwas thus entitled to injunctive relief. Id at 729-30, 9 S.E.2d at 387-88.
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modification by the court.255 Similarly, a property settlement is not subject to
modification except by agreement between the parties.256 The parties may
modify their agreements either expressly, so long as the modification is sup-
ported by consideration, or impliedly, under estoppel or detrimental reliance
principles.257 In addition, as discussed previously, there are two conditions
imposed by G.S. 50-16.9(a) that must be met for a court to be able to modify
a money payment.258 That there must be an "order" is relatively clear. The
order itself, however, must be one that commands the payment of technical
alimony. Once these conditions are met, G.S. 50-16.9(a) provides that the
order may be "modified or vacated at any time, upon motion in the cause and
a showing of changed circumstances..."
Determining what is technical alimony, however, is not always an easy
task. In essence, alimony is nothing more than "a substitute for the common
law obligation of the husband to support the wife."'259 And regardless of the
labels used, if a money payment to a dependent spouse is determined to be
part of a property settlement, or reciprocal consideration therefor, it will not
be alimony, and thus not be subject to modification. 260 Moreover, given that
property settlements and separation agreements are often inextricably com-
bined into a single instrument, the problem is one that is frequently encoun-
tered.261 This is particularly true in North Carolina where courts, until
recently, have not had the power to make property distributions incident to
divorce. Thus, if there was to be a property division, it had to be accomplished
though private negotiations between the parties.
262
255. Van Every v. Van Every, 265 N.C. 506, 512, 144 S.E.2d 603, 607 (1965) ("A valid separa-
tion agreement cannot be set aside or ignored without the consent of both parties."); Kiger v.
Kiger, 258 N.C. 126, 129, 128 S.E.2d 235, 237 (1962) ("The provisions of a valid separation agree-
ment. . . cannot be ignored or set aside by the court without the consent of the parties."); Mc-
Kaughn v. McKaughn, 29 N.C. App., 702, 705, 225 S.E.2d 616, 618 (1976) (court is without power
to modify a separation agreement except "(1) to provide for adequate support for minor children,
and (2) with the mutual consent of the parties thereto where rights of third parties have not inter-
vened.").
256. Bunn v. Bunn, 262 N.C. 67, 70, 136 S.E.2d 240, 243 (1964); and Holsomback v. Hol-
somback, 273 N.C. 728, 161 S.E.2d 99 (1968).
257. Wheeler v. Wheeler, 40 N.C. App. 54, 252 S.E.2d 106 (1979) (consideration and estop-
pel), rev'd, 299 N.C. 633, 263 S.E.2d 763 (1980) (waiver); and Beverly v. Beverly, 43 N.C. App. 60,
257 S.E.2d 682 (1979). For cases dealing with estoppel principles insofar as they relate to separa-
tion agreements and consent judgments, see Howland v. Stitzer, 236 N.C. 230, 72 S.E.2d 583, ceri,
denied, 345 U.S. 935 (1952); Pulley v. Pulley, 255 N.C. 423, 121 S.E.2d 876 (1961), cerl. denied, 371
U.S. 22 (1962); Broughton v. Broughton, 22 N.C. App. 233, 206 S.E.2d 302 (1974); Hamilton v.
Hamilton, 296 N.C. 574, 251 S.E.2d 441 (1979); and Shankle v. Shankle, 26 N.C. App. 565, 216
S.E.2d 915 (1975).
258. In order for a court to have the power to modify a support provision in a judgment under
N.C. GEM. STAT. § 50-16.9(a) (1976) there must be an "order" of the court, and the order must be
one to pay alimony. These requirements are discussed in more detail in White v. White, 296 N.C.
661, 662, 252 S.E.2d 698, 701 (1979); and Jones v. Jones, 42 N.C. App. 467, 256 SE.2d 474 (1979).
259. 2 R. LEE, supra note 35, § 135, at 148.
260. 2 A. LINDEY, supra note 3, § 31, at 31-72.
261. The effect of combining the two essentially different kinds of agreements into one instru-
ment has been said to connote "not only complete and permanent cessation of marital relations,
but a full and final settlement of all property rights of every kind and character." Bost v. Bost, 234
N.C. 554, 557, 67 S.E.2d 745, 747 (1951).
262. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.7 (1976) states that "Alimony. . . shall be paid by lump sum
payment, periodic payments, or by transfer of title or possession of personal property or any inter-
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The best starting point for a discussion of North Carolina law on this
issue is again Bunn v. Bunn. "Needless to say," the court in Bunn observed, "a
judgment which purports to be a complete settlement of all property and mari-
tal rights between the parties and which does not award alimony within the
accepted definition of that term is not subject to modification even though it
adjudges that the wife recover a specific money judgment."263 Although it
was not an issue in the case, the supreme court went on to state the general
rule in this area:
However, an agreement for the division of property rights and an
order for the payment of alimony may be included as separable pro-
visions in a consent judgment. In such event the division of property
would be beyond the power of the court to change, but the order for
future installments of alimony would be subject to modification in a
proper case. . . . However, if the support provision and the division
of property constitute a reciprocal consideration so that the entire
agreement would be destroyed by a modification of the support pro-
vision, they are not separable and may not be changed without the
consent of both parties.
264
It is easy enough, of course, to indicate within the agreement that the
support and property divisions are separable. In one case, the agreement con-
tained the following model clause:
The provisions for the support, maintenance and alimony of wife are
independent of any division or agreement for division of property
between the parties, and shall not for any purposes be deemed to be a
part of or merged in or integrated with a property settlement of the
parties.2
65
It is equally easy to indicate that they are not independent provisions.266 Un-
est therein, or a security interest in or possession of real property." For a criticism of this ex-
tremely limited power to affect property, see Marshall, Proposed Reforms in North Carolina
Divorce Law, 8 N.C. CENT. L.J. 35 (1967).
Although North Carolina is listed in two well-researched articles as a "modified common law
property state" it should more accurately be classified as one of the few (six) remaining strict
common law property states, where title alone determines division of proty upon divorce. See
Erickson, Spousal Support Toward the Realization of Education Goals: Bow the Law Can Insure
Reciprocity, 1978 Wis. L. REv. 947; and Freed & Foster, supra note 2, at 307-08. As a practical
matter, possession of, or a security interest in, the marital home is awarded only incident to child
support. Moreover, attempts by trial courts to decree lump-sum alimony have been consistently
struck down on the rationale that such sums are in reality attempts to divide property. See, e.g.,
Taylor v. Taylor, 46 N.C. App. 438, 265 S.E.2d 626 (1980); Taylor v. Taylor, 26 N.C. App. 592,
216 S.E.2d 737 (1975); Schloss v. Schloss, 273 N.C. 266, 160 S.E.2d 5 (1968). The remaining
common law states are Florida, Mississippi, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and West Virginia.
263. Bunn v. Bunn, 262 N.C. 67, 70, 136 S.E.2d 240, 243 (1964).
264. Id
265. Britt v. Britt, 36 N.C. App. 705, 711, 245 S.E.2d 381, 385 (1978). Merely using two sepa-
rate headings within the agreement aids in making this distinction.
266. In Robuck v. Robuck, 20 N.C. App. 374, 375-78, 201 S.E.2d 557, 559-61 (1974), a separa-
tion agreement, drawn in Tennessee, provided for $100,000.00 in a lump sum to be paid to the
wife and further provided that this sum "is not and shall not be construed to be payments of
alimony... [but is rather the share] in an equitable distribution of the property accumulated by
the parties during the tenure of their marriage." The court of appeals hefd tat le agreement was
clearly a property settlement and so did not constitute a bar to the wife's cross claim for alimony
in her husband's suit for divorce.
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fortunately these clear-cut distinctions are frequently not made.
An important and recent supreme court case has provided excellent gui-
dance for the bench and the bar on this issue. In White v. White a separation
agreement between the parties was "adopted" in a consent judgment, which
ordered, adjudged, and decreed the husband to pay permanent alimony to his
wife in the sum of $100.00 per week until her death or remarriage, pay her
$1,000.00 in lump sum, and convey to her his half interest in the marital
home.267 The couple were later divorced, and in 1976 the wife sought an in-
crease in alimony on the grounds of changed circumstances. The lower court
held, however, that the property and support provisions of the judgment were
not separable and thus the "alimony" was not subject to modification. The
supreme court repeated the standard rule that periodic support payments
made to a dependent spouse, even though denominated alimony, "may not be
alimony within the meaning of the statute and thus modifiable if they and
other provisions for a property division between the parties constitute recipro-
cal consideration for each other."268
In these circumstances, the answer always lies in the intentions of the par-
ties, but the parties here gave no clear indication of what their intentions were.
The court, therefore, went on to hold that further evidentiary hearings on the
circumstances of the parties at the time they entered into the contract would be
necessary and remanded for that purpose. It did, however, set out certain
guidelines for the hearing below and held that when the intent of the parties is
not clearly expressed, there should be a presumption "that provisions in a sep-
aration agreement or consent judgment made a part of the court's order are
separable and that provisions for support payments therein are subject to
modification upon an appropriate showing of changed circumstances. '269
Further, the court noted, the presumption imposes upon the party opposing
modification the burden of proof on the issue, a burden that may be met only
by a preponderance of the evidence. 270
In summary, unlike the situation with regard to "adoption," or merger,
enforceability and modification, the rules concerning integration of a property
settlement and separation agreement in North Carolina are rather straightfor-
ward. Given the necessity for private settlement of property rights and the
267. 296 N.C. 661, 664, 252 S.E.2d 698, 700 (1979).
268. Id at 666, 252 S.E.2d at 701.
269. Id at 672, 252 S.E.2d at 704.
270. Id In a court of appeals case shortly after this, it was held, based upon While, that a
payment denominated "support and alimony" was in fact reciprocal consideration for property
transfers and therefore it was proper to deny the wife's motion for an increase in payments, on the
ground that they were not subject to modification. Jones v. Jones, 42 N.C. App. 467, 256 S.E.2d
474 (1979). The court found the following factors to be of significance in reaching this conclusion:
(I) that there was no finding that the wife was a dependent spouse, (2) no finding that grounds for
alimony had existed, (3) that the "alimony" payments were contingent upon the wife's leaving the
house and conveying her half to her husband, (4) that the payments were limited to 32 months
duration and (5) that the wife agreed to convey half interest in another piece of property without
further consideration. Id at 471, 256 S.E.2d at 476. The court further said, "[W]e note that the
plaintiff alleged in his complaint that the defendant had committed adultery. The defendant did
not answer the complaint and then agreed to the consent judgment." Id, 256 S.E.2d at 477.
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frequency with which the two types of agreements are combined into one in-
strument, it is essential that attorneys and clients understand the consequences
of the form of their agreements. Although, through Bunn and White, a pre-
sumption exists that the two are separable, there is no good reason for relying
upon that presumption if the parties intend for the two agreements to be in-
dependent of one another.
III. CONCLUSION
North Carolina's attempts to protect its third party interest in marriage
dissolution and at the same time encourage private settlement of divorce inci-
dents have been only partially successful. Given the conflicts that exist not
only between the interests of the parties and those of the state, but also often
between inconsistent policies of the state as well, this mixed result is hardly
surprising. Several observations may be made, however.
First, it is clear that in North Carolina, as in most states, the initial judi-
cial hostility that surrounded the development of separation agreements has
largely disappeared. Judicial scrutiny has shifted focus from the function to
the substance of the agreements. Unfortunately, development of substantive
standards of fairness and freedom from fraud and duress has hardly begun in
North Carolina. With the repeal of the privy examination statute, however,
and the strong indication of a new attitude toward duress and the confidential
relationship, 71 there is every reason to hope that equitable and sensible stan-
dards may yet evolve. Balancing the interests of the state and of private par-
ties does not always require a lesser degree of state involvement.
Second, neither the state nor the parties are well served by the current
status of the law on reconciliation. The principle that any isolated act of inter-
course between the spouses constitutes a reconciliation is, in all likelihood,
contrary to the intent of the parties. It is certainly counterproductive of the
state's interest in encouraging reconciliations.
Third, a new and more liberal attitude is obvious in the areas of merger
and its consequences, as seen in the cases of Moore v. Moore and Levitch v.
Levitch.272 The cumulative effect of those cases is to lessen the differences
between the consequences of "mere approval" and "adoption" of agreements
by decrees, and to expand the methods by which adoption may be accom-
plished. It should be repeated, however, that adoption through incorporation
should not be accomplished contrary to intentions expressed in the agreement.
The interests of the state are sufficiently served by the existing rules regarding
adoption and approval. Within those limits, parties should be able to make
informed choices with the knowledge that courts will respect those choices.
Finally, it should be emphasized that informed choices are possible. As is
true in most states, North Carolina law on separation agreements is complex.
It is inconsistent in some ways and contains several traps for the unwary, but it
271. Link v. Link, 278 N.C. 181, 179 S.E.2d 697 (1971), discussed at notes 101-107 supra.
272. Levitch is discussed at notes 225-35 supra, and Moore at notes 240-49 supra.
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is not impenetrable. A thorough understanding of the law, both as to validity
and enforcement of agreements, is the only real means by which many of the
worst features of the fault-adversarial system may be avoided. Successful ne-
gotiation of separation agreements, like successful litigation, partakes both of
a science and an art. Private settlement, however, is a considerably more hu-
mane alternative.
